

УНІВЕРСАЛ

Української Центральної Ради

до українського народу, на Україні й по-за Україною сущого.

Народе Український! Народе селян, робітників, трудямого людю!

Волею своєю ти постави нас, УКРАЇНСЬКУ, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНУ РАДУ, на сторожі прав і вольностей Укра-

THE PEASANT RENAISSANCE OF THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION PERIOD OF 1917-1921

Scientific monograph

Правительству наші домагання.

А націоновіші домагання ті були цілі:

1. Щоб Українська Центральна Рада, як окреим актом заявило, що воно не стоїть проти національної волі України, проти прав нашого народу на АВТОНОМІЮ.

Щоб Центральне Російське Правительство по всіх справах, що торкаються України, мало при собі нашого комісара по українських справах.

Щоб місцева власть на Україні була об'єднана одним представником від Центрального Російського Правительства, се-б то, вибраним нами, комісаром на Україні.

Щоб певна частина грошей, які збираються з Центральної Казни з нашого народу, була віддана нам, представникам свого народу на національно-культурні потреби його.

Всі ці домагання наші Центральне Російське Правительство ОДКІНУЛО.

Воно не хотіло сказати, чи признає за нашим народом право на автономію, на право самому порядкувати своїм життям. Воно ухилилось од відповіді, одіславши нас до майбутнього Всеросійського Учредительного Зібрання.

Центральне Російське Правительство не хотіло мати при собі нашого комісара, НЕ СХОТИЛО РАЗОМ З НАМИ ТВОРИТИ НОВИЙ ЛАД.

Так само НЕ СХОТИЛО ПРИЗНАТИ КОМІСАРА НА УКРАЇНУ, щоб ми могли разом з ним вести наш край до ладу й порядку.

І гроші, що збираються з нашої землі, одмовилося повернути на потреби нашої школи, освіти й організації. І тепер, Народе Український, нас приневолено, щоб ми самі творили нашу долю. Ми не можемо допустити край наш на безладді та занепад. Коли Тимчасове Російське Правительство не може дати лад у нас, коли не хоче стати разом з нами до великої роботи, то ми самі повинні взяти її на себе. Се наш обов'язок перед нашим краєм і перед тими народами, що живуть на нашій землі.

І через те ми, УКРАЇНСЬКА ЦЕНТРАЛЬНА РАДА, видаємо сей УНІВЕРСАЛ до всього нашого народу і оповідаємо: ОДИНІЙ САМИ БУДЕМО ТВОРИТИ НАШЕ ЖИТТЯ.

Отже, хай кожен член нашої нації, кожен громадянин села чи города одиниці знає, що настав час великої роботи.

Од сього часу кожне село, кожна волость, кожна управа городська чи земська, яка стоїть за інтереси Українського Народу, повинна мати НАЙТИШИШІ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ ЗІСНОСИ З ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЮ РАДОЮ.

Там, де через якісь причини адміністративна влада зосталась в руках людей, ворожих до українства, приписуємо нашим громадянам повести широкую дуже організацію та освідмлення народу, і тоді ПЕРЕВІБРАТИ АДМІНІСТРАЦІЮ.

В городах і тих місцях, де українська людність живе всміж з іншими національностями, приписуємо нашим громадянам негайно ПРИЙТИ ДО ЗГОДИ Й ПОРОЗУМІННЯ З ДЕМОКРАТІЄЮ ТИХ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОСТЕЙ і разом з ними приступити до підготовки нового правильного життя.

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНА РАДА покладає надію, що народи неукраїнські, що живуть на нашій землі, також добачуть про лад та спокій в нашій країні і в сей тяжкий час вседержавного безладдя, дружно одноставно з нами стануть до праці коло організації АВТОНОМІЇ УКРАЇНИ.

І коли ми зробимо сю підготовчу організаційну роботу, ми скличемо представників від усіх народів Землі Української і виробимо закони для неї. Ті закони, той увесь лад, який ми підготуємо, Всеросійське Учредительне Зібрання має затвердити своїм законом.

Народе Український. Перед твоїм вибраним органом—УКРАЇНСЬКОЮ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЮ РАДОЮ стоїть велика і висока стіна, яку й треба повалити, щоб випустити народ свій на вільний шлях.

Треба духних, сміливих рук. Треба великої народної праці. А для успіху той праці не може бути ніякої перешкоди, ніякої копоти (гроші). До сього часу український народ всі копоти свої оддавав у Всеросійське Правительство, а тепер ми маємо, та немає й тепер від неї того, що повинен би мати за се.

Учредительне Зібрання, Українська Центральна Рада, приписуємо всім організованим громадянам сел і городов, що мають справу з адміністративним управлінням і установам з 1-го числа місяця липня (юля) накласти на людський труд свій обов'язок: виконувати справу і точно і негайно регулярно пересилати його В СКАРБНИЦЮ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ РАДИ.

Народе Український! В твоїх руках доля твоєї, і сей трудний час всевітнього безладдя й розпаду долажи своєю одноставністю і державним розумом, що ти народ, народ хайборів, можеш гордо і достойно стати поруч з кожним організованим, державним народом, як рівний з рівним.



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REVIEWERS:

Telvak Vitaliy

Doctor of History, Professor, Department of World History and Special Historical Disciplines, Ivan Franko Drohobych State Pedagogical University, Drohobych, Ukraine;

Masnenko Vitaliy

Doctor of History, Professor, Head of the Department of History of Ukraine, Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University of Cherkasy, Cherkasy, Ukraine

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The beginning of the XXI century once again poses global civilizational challenges to humanity, which actualize the need to comprehend historical experience. The Ukrainian history of the first third of the XX century, in particular the period of revolutionary transformations of 1917–1921, provides the keys to understanding the nature of the socio-cultural and political changes taking place nowadays. Analogies between the events of a century ago and the present time contain not only historical interest but also scientific and practical imperative.

The monograph “The Peasant Renaissance of the Ukrainian Revolution Period of 1917–1921” is devoted to the study of an under-researched but crucial phenomenon – the peasant-centered dimension of the revolutionary process. The peasantry was not only the largest social group in Ukraine at the time, but also became an active subject of nation-building, a source of ideological impulses and a driver of political change. It was in their midst that the understanding of a just system, their own place in national existence, and a vision of the country's future were formed.

The monograph examines the peasant-centered concept of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 as interpreted by Dmytro Dontsov. This concept allows us to comprehend the revolution as a phenomenon in which the peasantry appears not as an object but as a subject of history, a creator of new political, social, and cultural meanings. Dontsov emphasized the uniqueness of the peasant worldview of the Ukrainian nation, its natural desire for independence, rootedness in its own land and spiritual traditions.

The authors also analyze Germany's food policy in Ukraine at the turn of 1917–1918. Particular attention is paid to the confiscation of grain from the peasants as an element

of military and economic pressure and a factor that deeply affected the peasant perception of power, justice, and property rights. These events became a catalyst for the intensification of peasant protests and the formation of national resistance, fueled by a deep social instinct to protect their way of life.

The revolutionary years of 1917–1921 are considered as a period of realization of the socio-cultural nature of the Ukrainian peasantry. At this time, unique forms of peasant self-organization were formed, a deep mental and cultural identity was manifested, and agrarianism was crystallized as an ideology closely linked to national liberation.

The monograph also attempts to comprehend the peasantry not only as a social class or economic category, but as a fundamental historical subject. The author focuses on theoretical and historical approaches to the peasantry in Ukrainian and world historiography, the peculiarities of the peasant narrative, etc. This view allows us to integrate the peasant experience into the broader context of civilizational development and restore its place in the national historical imagination.

Thus, this monograph is an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the peasant revival in the context of the revolutionary events of the early twentieth century. Its goal is not only to reconstruct historical processes but also to understand the peasantry as a cultural and political factor that determined the logic and dynamics of the Ukrainian Revolution. The authors aim to contribute to expanding the boundaries of modern historiography, to offer new interpretations of familiar events, and to arouse further scholarly interest in the peasant-centered aspect of Ukrainian history.

**THE PEASANT-CENTERED CONCEPT
OF THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION (1917–1921)**

BY DMYTRO DONTSOV

Among the galaxy of Ukrainian thinkers and theorists of the concepts of nation-building in the twentieth century, Dontsov holds a prominent place. His thoughts, ideas, approaches, understanding of the peculiarities of national nation- and state-building, and the prospects of the Ukrainian political nation have not lost their relevance in the current situation. Their comprehension will contribute to a clearer understanding of the latest Ukrainian realities and outline statehood prospects. The publication and republication of his works during the years of Ukraine's independence¹, on the one hand, is a confirmation of their relevance, and on the other hand, it is a return from oblivion of the figure of an original Ukrainian theorist of the European level.

The theoretical heritage of the thinker, given its powerful intellectual potential, has attracted and will continue to attract the attention of researchers, public and political figures, and society as a whole. Quantitative and qualitative indicators of the already accumulated knowledge about her are sufficient grounds to speak of Donetsk studies as a subdisciplinary area of scientific discourse. In particular, there is an institutionalization of Donetsk studies. In Ukraine, the Dmytro Dontsov Scientific and

¹ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики та інші праці. Тернопіль : Крила, 2022. 368 с.

Ideological Center was created and is now functioning². According to the analysis of the latest historiography³, the focus of researchers' attention is mainly on issues related to Dontsov as a theorist of the current Ukrainian nationalism^{4; 5}, the developer of the nationalist concept of the state^{6; 7; 8}, the comparison of Dontsov's and V. Lypynsky's⁹ views, etc.

At the same time, the issues related to Dontsov's concept of the peasant revolution of the early twentieth century, the role and importance of the peasantry in Dontsov's model of Ukrainian revolutionary events, and the formation of Ukrainian statehood are presented to a lesser extent. For example, O. Zaitsev examines the stages in Dontsov's understanding of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 and the evolution of his views on it¹⁰.

In view of this, the purpose of the study is to reveal the content of Dontsov's concept of the peasant revolution, the agrarian

² Науково-ідеологічний центр імені Дмитра Донцова. URL: <http://dontsov-nic.com.ua/author/donzadmin/>

³ Шліхта І. Постать Дмитра Донцова у працях українських учених. *Українська біографістика*. 2008. Вип. 4. С. 283–296.

⁴ Ситник О. Донцов Д. і проблема української національної ідеології. *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. 2009. Вип. XXVII. С. 140–143.

⁵ Лукашенко Є. Чинний націоналізм Дмитра Донцова. *Політикус*. 2016. Вип. 3. С. 9–19.

⁶ Онуфріїв Р. Становлення та основні засади націократичної концепції держави в 1920–1930-х рр. *Юридичний науковий електронний журнал*. 2021. № 1. С. 412–415.

⁷ Харахаш Б. Ідея нації у творчості Дмитра Донцова. *Українські проблеми*. 1998. № 1. С. 128–140.

⁸ Зайцев О. Доктрина Дмитра Донцова та її вплив на націоналістичний рух 1920–1940-х років. *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність*. 2014. Вип. 24. С. 16–34.

⁹ Віхров М. Липинський і Донцов: спір на грані двох світів. URL: <https://tyzhden.ua/lypynskij-i-dontsov-spir-na-hrani-dvokh-svitiv/>

¹⁰ Зайцев О. Осмислення досвіду Української революції у творах Дмитра Донцова. *Історія та історіографія в Європі*. 2016. Вип. 5. С. 77–88.

component in Dontsov's theoretical heritage, presented in the work "The Grounds of Our Politics"¹¹.

"The Grounds of Our Politics is a work written by Dontsov in the context of the Ukrainian revolutionary reality of 1920–1921. The author worked on it in Bern and completed it in early January 1921: "I have finished my book and feel like a woman who has already given birth"¹².

A prominent place in the book is devoted to the analysis of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, in which he was a direct participant. At the same time, this is not a retelling of the facts, but a reflection of the thinker on revolution as a phenomenon in general and the Ukrainian revolution in particular. The philosopher derives the concept of "revolution" etymologically from the French word "la revolution," that is, "the rotation of the Earth around the Sun." On this basis, Dontsov understood "revolution" as a circular movement that ends at the point where the movement began ... a movement that could never have any end." The proposed interpretation compared favorably with the dominant version of "revolution" at the time, which "has some mystical and, so to say, anti-scientific meaning" as "just a large-scale brawl"¹³.

The nature of revolution, Dontsov argued, is dominated by the irrational: "not an action, not a conscious plan, but revenge". Accordingly, the revolution is not made with the aim of "achieving something positive, only because the offended revolutionary conscience was looking for an access to the outside"¹⁴. He also interpreted the concept of "counterrevolution" in an original way. He understood it as "the tendency to replace anarchy with a new, but still

¹¹ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. 212 с.

¹² Зайцев О. Осмислення досвіду Української революції у творах Дмитра Донцова. *Історія та історіографія в Європі*. 2016. Вип. 5. С. 78.

¹³ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 110.

¹⁴ Ibid.

anarchic system, which, like the one that has just been overthrown, soon begins to betray the tendency to stabilization and thus to conservatism”¹⁵.

He identified the 1917–1921 revolution as a socio-political one. Dontsov distinguished between the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions. The basis for this identification for him was its results. In his opinion, the Russian Revolution led to fundamental political changes, caused the fall of “tsarist absolutism, official Orthodoxy, and the political superiority of the Russian people.” The Ukrainian Revolution resulted in the subjectivization and formation of the Ukrainian nation. This was manifested in the constitution of “own forms of political, legal, state and church life”¹⁶. The driving force and creator of the Ukrainian Revolution, according to the thinker, are “Ukrainians, not russians”¹⁷.

Another difference between the Ukrainian Revolution and the russian revolution was its character, its specific mover or Actor. Dontsov formulated his own vision of the Ukrainian Revolution. In his understanding, it is social, bourgeois, not socialist. It is “the creation of a respectable stratum of the average peasant bourgeois, a type that will *mutatis mutandis*, like one eye to the other, resemble this man to whom Maupassant devoted so many hours of his talent.” For him, it was obvious that the non-socialist character of the Ukrainian Revolution was due to the following factors. First, socialist ideas were not widespread among the peasantry, “no one stood behind them, except for a handful of town workers and the uneducated, classified and moscow-based, though in love with the Kobzar, intelligentsia.” The poor peasantry was “as far from socialism as other peasants.” Second, workers and peasants are different from each other. First of all, in their sources of income.

¹⁵ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 110.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. С. 111.

A worker, having a source of income in wages, “can be a socialist”. The source of a peasant’s income is private property, and therefore he is “a party to the principle of private property”¹⁸. Their separateness by this criterion also determines the fundamental difference between them and between the revolutions in which they are actors. Thirdly, the purpose of peasants’ participation in the revolution, taking into account the second factor, is to increase their own wealth¹⁹.

Thus, the thinker summarized, the revolution that the peasantry made in Ukraine could not “be socialist, even in its intentions. It was not socialist in fact”²⁰. The Ukrainian revolution, which had a peasant character, lasted from 1902. Dontsov saw its origins in the peasant riots of 1902 in Kharkiv and Poltava regions. In his understanding, it was an explosion of energy of the Ukrainian nation that took place three years earlier than the First Russian Revolution of 1905–1907²¹.

Justifying the peasant character of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, he drew attention to the reasons for the explosion of energy of the Ukrainian nation. The author of *The Grounds of Our Politics* proposes an approach according to which “the reasons for it lay in the incompleteness of the coup that Alexander II made in 1863.” The thinker makes a certain inaccuracy. In the year he mentioned, the tsarist government, in order to prevent the spread of the Polish uprising on the Right Bank and its support by the peasants, introduced mandatory land redemption by peasants, and the number of payments was reduced by 20%. These measures accelerated the elimination of the status of temporarily obligated peasants. More than 1.5 million peasants have switched

¹⁸ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 111.

¹⁹ Ibid. С. 112.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid. С. 109, 112.

to compulsory land purchases. This accelerated the transition of temporarily obligated peasants to the category of peasant owners²².

Obviously, Dontsov was referring to the Great Reform of 1861, the abolition of serfdom in the Russian Empire. Later in the text, he unequivocally speaks of the imperfection and incompleteness of this large-scale nationwide event – the abolition of serfdom, the presence of post-serfdom elements in the countryside. The “incompleteness” of the Great Reform of 1861, in his opinion, was as follows:

- 1) peasant smallholdings – “peasants have executed up to 24% of the land”;
- 2) economic dependence of the peasant on the lord;
- 3) low economic and socio-legal status of the peasant;
- 4) the desire of peasants to own the land on which they worked;
- 5) the desire for freedom – “the final abolition” of serfdom as an economic dependence.

The latter reason gives the peasant character of the Ukrainian Revolution another distinctive feature from the Russian Revolution. According to D. Dontsov, it is European character. In particular, sharing the opinion of O. Bauer, he “sees in this new revolution for the complete destruction of serfdom an analogy to the European revolution of 1848.” Similar peasant revolutions in the early twentieth century took place in “the whole of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary, Romania, Croats, Poland, and the Balkan States, as well as Ukraine, are under the sign of a great peasant-bourgeois revolution...”²³.

According to the theorist of contemporary nationalism, the First World War was a powerful external geopolitical factor in the modern history of Europe in general and Central and South-Eastern Europe in particular. As a powerful catalyst for the transformation of the map

²² Лазанська Т. Тимчасовозобов'язані селяни. URL: http://www.history.org.ua/?termin=Тимчасовозобов'язані_селяни

²³ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 112–113.

of Europe, it caused fundamental multilevel changes. The first level was the reformatting of its political landscape. The second was the renaissance of the peasantry as an active subject of history. The third is that, apart from the First World War, the revolution became the instrument of fundamental transformations in Europe. According to D. Dontsov, the first manifestation was “the collapse of three great powers, Russia, Austria, and Hungary...”. From the standpoint of modern knowledge, it is more correct to speak of the collapse of four empires: Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman. However, this does not change the fundamental point: the emergence of new subjects of international relations at that time. The manifestation of the latter in the countries “which we called the South-East of the Occident” is the displacement of old elites: “it (the old aristocracy – «C.K.») was replaced by a new class – peasant democracy”, which was ‘of epochal importance in the political history of Europe’²⁴. The third manifestation was the peasant revolution in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe.

The First World War and the peasant revolutions in Europe led to the emergence of a new actor on the stage of European history in the early twentieth century, a transformer of pre-war life and a designer of new political realities. It was the peasantry. In fact, the agrarian sector of the European economy, peasant cooperation, and the peasantry, paradoxically at first glance, found themselves in a much more favorable socioeconomic and socio-political position than they had been before. Crisis phenomena in industry, financial and banking systems, and urban culture, according to the thinker, freed “the peasant from hypothetical debts.” The shackles of urban civilization, with all its consequences, ceased to constrain the energy of the peasantry and peasant cooperation. Its development gave impetus to qualitative and radical changes, to the emergence of a new type of peasant – previously unknown, unrecognizable. According

²⁴ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 112–113.

to D. Dontsov, “from a disheveled white slave, a slave of the city,” the peasant became the center, “the axis around which the entire economic life of the countries torn by war begins to revolve”²⁵.

In fact, the emergence of such a peasant-centered approach is the peasant renaissance in Central and Southeastern Europe in general and in Ukraine in particular. The revival of the peasantry, according to the philosopher’s concept, led to its priority in the areas of economy and defense. At the same time, transformations took place in Ukrainian national life. They relate to the change of “the landed aristocracy, which has ceased to give social value to society, has postponed the leadership of the nation, giving way to a new class that has as its ideal ‘organized individual initiative’...”. In the Ukrainian realities of the time, the thinker believed that “the old-fashioned class ... has now let go of its weak arms.” In view of this, it was logical, in his opinion, to turn to the peasantry and political influence²⁶.

In fact, Dontsov argues in favor of the peasantry as the leader of the modern Ukrainian nation, the peasantry as the bearer of Ukrainian identity, the embodiment of national ideals and virtues, and the socio-economic and socio-political basis of Ukrainian statehood. He states without humiliation that Ukrainians are a peasant nation. “The Ukrainian peasant has already made his revolution and no longer needs any other”²⁷.

In Dontsov’s conception of the peasant revolution, we observe the author’s intelligent and critical peasant-centeredness. The thinker realized that in the early twentieth century the peasantry was not fully prepared for state-building. At the same time, in the context of the Ukrainian Revolution, the peasantry acted as a trigger

²⁵ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 113–114.

²⁶ Ibid. С. 114.

²⁷ Ibid. С. 116.

for the then non-linear processes of Ukrainian nation-building, to use modern terminology.

As a real actor of historical reality, it had its own characteristics and peculiarities compared to other participants in the revolutionary events. According to D. Dontsov, among others, the peasantry was a separate entity endowed with the following characteristics. The first was a deep awareness of its interests. The second was “a great political instinct”. The third is “quick orientation”. The fourth is “indomitable stubbornness in pursuit of goals”. The fifth is “organizational dexterity”. The sixth is “sense of order”. The seventh is “complete indifference to pacifism, anti-militarism, and other ‘isms’”. The eighth is “aristocratic aversion to all forms of ochlocracy, forcibly imposed on ... the intellectuals”²⁸.

Thus, for the philosopher, the Ukrainian peasantry, endowed with the above-mentioned virtues, is the foundation of a strong house of “own statehood.” He supports his arguments by saying that the peasantry is the genius of the “Ukrainian race.” It is endowed with “profound wisdom,” “innate waywardness, and a developed sense of action”²⁹.

How did Dontsov see the palace of his “own statehood”? Based on a peasant-centered approach to interpreting the events of the Ukrainian Revolution and the processes of national statehood formation, in 1920–1921, at the time of writing, the thinker proposed an original model of the latter. He was guided by the fact that the peasant, the peasant ideology, is an antidote to Bolshevism and nihilism³⁰. In essence, it was a “third way” (similar to the agrarian interpretation) between liberal and socialist strategies of state building. It was a kind of peasant alternative that was realized in the Second Polish Republic, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia

²⁸ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 126.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid. С. 200.

in the interwar period. His ideal was a “peasant petty-bourgeois republic”³¹. Thus, he associated the statehood of Ukraine with the peasantry and the peasant petty-bourgeois republic.

For the philosopher, the concept of “peasant petty-bourgeois republic” was synonymous with “peasant democracy.” Understanding and distinguishing the essential aspects of this phenomenon is the focus of the work “The Foundations of Our Politics”. In his characteristic authorial manner, he explains what democracy is in general, its varieties, and the essence of peasant democracy itself.

The philosopher wrote: “I understand the word democracy to mean something completely different than our professional democrats, and I do not belong to those who will fall to their knees before an idea expressed in seven words.” For Dontsov, democracy is “a fact that must be accepted, whether we like it or not... Unable to destroy it, we must take it into our hands and regulate it, because, unbridled and unregulated, it will destroy civilization.” In his opinion, “there is democracy and democracy,” so the settlement of democracy is not “circle quadrature”³².

Reflecting on “democracy and democracy,” the thinker understood the diversity of forms of this phenomenon. He distinguished between the following types of democracy:

- 1) “democracy of the ‘demons’, Shyhayevshchyna”;
- 2) “moscow’s ‘nothingness’”;
- 3) “democracy of Ruso, that great plebeian, as he is unanimously called by Nietzsche and Carlyle”;
- 4) “Wagner’s ‘Twilight of the Gods’”;
- 5) “the democracy of Beethoven’s Eroica”;
- 6) “the democracy of a French or Bulgarian peasant or Canadian farmer”;

³¹ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 119.

³² Ibid. С. 202.

- 7) “the democracy of a Savoyard or Gascon”;
- 8) “the democracy of a German social democrat”³³.

Dontsov tried to summarize the diversity of democracies of that time in the following scheme. On the one hand, there are democracies of “pacifism, egalitarianism, anti-militarism, ochlocracy, acorn socialism and class struggle, democracy of universal and leveling of the reification of numbers, sentimental and anemic people’s government”. On the other hand, it is a democracy of “labor, hierarchy, social solidarity, duty, and a strong grip.” The nature and content of democracies determined their role in the life of the nation and the state. According to this criterion, the thinker distinguished the following types of democracy: “the one that plants and binds society together, ... the one that destroys and builds”. What is common to all of them is that the priority regulator in the democracies of such societies is “the low materialistic instincts of the masses or the arbitrariness of the master over a flock of equal slaves”³⁴. Thus, these were antagonistic democracies, democracies of extremes.

Among them, another democracy stood out in a qualitatively better way. The researcher identified it as a democracy of “self-discipline, of higher ideas, which, like ‘family,’ ‘native land,’ and ‘social solidarity,’ make one social organism of a higher order out of an agglomerate of divergent wills.” Such democracy, according to Dontsov, is “an element of production, labor, and an element of freedom and amateurism.” It is an ideal for him. For the thinker, a typical country with an ideal democracy was “North America”³⁵.

At the same time, it was not only “North America” that embodied Donets’s ideal of democracy. He also saw its features on the European continent. In particular, in peasant democracies

³³ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 202–203.

³⁴ Ibid. С. 203.

³⁵ Ibid.

in general and in the Ukrainian one in particular. Thanks to the peasantry itself, the thinker argued, democracy would acquire a new “breath of life,” a “proofreading.” Under the influence of the peasantry and its power, democracy will be able to withstand civilizational challenges and not fall victim to the latter³⁶.

Thus, there are sufficient grounds to say that Dontsov considered the democracy of Ukrainian peasants to be ideal. He understood it as a variant of the general ideal democracy inherent in North America and European peasant democracies. In this way, he did not diminish the role and importance of the Ukrainian peasantry, its state-building potential, and Ukrainian peasant democracy. On the contrary, he recognized it as a variant of an ideal world democracy. Accordingly, the “third way” of the Ukrainian peasantry in his understanding of the philosopher, which was identical to the agrarian one, corresponded to the global trend of the time.

For Dontsov, peasant democracy in general, or the democracy of the Ukrainian peasantry in particular, is ideal, different from others, given the idealism and separateness of the Ukrainian peasantry – its creator, carrier, and subject. As in the previous case – in justifying the uniqueness of the peasantry as an actor of Ukrainian nation- and state-building, and in the case of justifying the ideal of peasant democracy, the philosopher resorts to explaining this phenomenon by revealing the uniqueness of its carrier – the peasantry.

First of all, he emphasized the separateness of the peasantry from other subjects of the socio-cultural space of the time by the manner and style of world perception. Their specificity and difference from others form the peculiarities of the psychology of the Ukrainian peasantry. The main ones, according to the thinker, were as follows. First. The Ukrainian peasantry perceives the world through a refined prism that it has developed. According to it, only the peasant is its “rightful heir”. Second. He does not destroy the beauty

³⁶ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 204.

he is proud of, admires, and enjoys: “he does not trample on flowers with his feet.” The only thing he wants is to “have them for himself”. Third. He does not strive to “pull down those who are higher in deeds,” only to reach their level. Fourth. He does not humiliate the enemy, he fights with him as an equal, with whom “it is still necessary to somehow ‘get along’”. Fifth. Respect for property rights, rejection of the methods of “war communism”. Sixth. The peasantry is inherently revolutionary. It was clearly demonstrated during the peasant revolutions of 1902, 1905–1906, 1917, and the struggle against the Bolsheviks. Seventh. Peasant traditionalism, a deep understanding of the continuity of social evolution – all that is denied and misunderstood by the “apostles of the ‘world revolution’”. Eighth. An overdeveloped sense of humor, which testifies to the “organizing power of the intellect,” the desire for success and achievement, the tendency not to despair in the face of difficulties, and not to be afraid of death. Ninth. “The sound mind of our peasant”, his practicality and pragmatism. Tenth. Attraction to individualism: “a sense of personal worth and responsibility”. Accordingly, “opposition to the collective responsibility of nihilism”. Eleventh. Deep respect for such social, political, and spiritual institutions as the family, private property, the state, and the church. Twelfth. Patriotism of the peasantry. No nation or state can exist without patriotism. Thirteenth. The peasantry’s healthy skepticism of others: “a fully justified distrust of any stranger”. The thinker contrasted this trait with the “relaxing ‘internationalism’ of our social heroes”. Fourteenth. The Ukrainian national character of the peasant is different from his Moscow counterpart and is related “to the main foundations of the European psychotype”³⁷.

Thus, the above-mentioned main characteristic features of the psychology of the Ukrainian peasantry contemporary to Dontsov separated it as a carrier of peasant democracy, as well

³⁷ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 204–208.

as peasant democracy itself, from the carriers of other democracies and other democracies themselves. Thanks to this psychology, peasant democracy in general, and that of the Ukrainian peasantry in particular, was ideal, in line with the world's models of the time. The Ukrainian peasant, in the philosopher's interpretation, as the personification of Ukrainian peasant democracy, is a "social class of the future", "endowed with a developed legal consciousness, ready to defend its rights by all means, disdainful of ready-made ideologies, hostile to all 'socialisms', 'pacifisms' and 'internationalisms'³⁸. In other words, the Ukrainian peasantry is an actor of the nation with prospects. The Ukrainian peasant democracy, of which it is the carrier and embodiment, also has corresponding prospects.

It is known that the key ideologies of agrarianism are:

1) the uniqueness and indisputable value for humanity of the spiritual, moral, cultural and social properties inherent in the peasantry and its labor;

2) recognition of the peasantry as an independent stratum in political life;

3) not capitalist, but a "separate" peasant way of developing society, preservation of private property – small peasant property as its optimal regional variant and the basis for social progress, as well as the idea of a peasant cooperative state;

4) the superiority of agriculture and the countryside over industry and the city, as well as the peasantry over other social groups;

5) the peasantry – the agricultural layer – concentrates the main positive values and qualities of society, is the foundation of state stability and the bearer of national identity, and the listed virtues should determine its political power³⁹.

³⁸ Донцов Д. Підстави нашої політики. Відень : Видавництво Донцових, 1921. С. 207.

³⁹ Корнюченко С. Агратизм. Велика українська енциклопедія. URL: <https://vue.gov.ua/Агратизм>

Given the above, there are sufficient grounds to state that Dontsov's work "The Grounds of Our Politics" presents agrarian views. The concept of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, developed by him and duly substantiated, convincingly demonstrates its peasant character. Thus, Dontsov's intellectual heritage represents, among other things, the Ukrainian agrarian intellectual discourse. On the one hand, it harmoniously complements the theory of Ukrainian agrarianism represented by the works of P. Kulish, V. Lypynsky, H. Simantsiv, and other authors. On the other hand, it is a component of central and southeastern agrarian thought.

Information about the authors:

Serhii Kornovenko,

Doctor of History, Professor, Director of the Research Institute
of Peasantry and Agrarian History Studies,
Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University of Cherkasy,
Cherkasy, Ukraine

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6268-2321>

e-mail: s-kornovenko@ukr.net

Mykola Hlibischuk,

PhD (History), Assistant, Department of World History,
Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University,
Chernivtsi, Ukraine

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3829-9736>

e-mail: m.hlibischuk@chnu.edu.ua

THE PEASANTRY IN THE HISTORIOSOPHICAL NARRATION

The peasantry is an important milestone in civilizations formation, ensuring food security, developing economies, and preserving cultural traditions. Despite globalization, urbanization, and technological progress, the peasantry remains an important element of the modern world, but faces numerous challenges: economic marginalization, environmental crises, loss of autonomy due to integration into global markets, and the growing influence of agribusiness.

Contemporary studies of the peasantry cover a wide range of topics: from the historical contribution of peasants to revolutionary processes to their struggle for environmental sustainability and food sovereignty. However, the question remains open in scholarly discussions: how to combine a multidimensional approach to the study of the peasantry, which takes into account historical, social, cultural, and economic aspects, with an analysis of the challenges and prospects of this class in the modern world?

The importance of the problem is stipulated by the need to understand the peasantry not only as a socio-economic category, but also as a cultural and political actor capable of influencing global processes. This approach to understanding the peasantry allows us to better understand the dynamics of social change, local responses to global challenges, and the role of traditional practices in ensuring sustainable development.

R. Pipes¹, R. Redfield, S. Kornovenko², O. Mykhailiuk³, K. Ivangorodskiy⁴, Y. Prysiazhniuk⁵, A. Zayarniuk⁶ and other researchers have studied certain aspects of the topic we have raised.

The objective of the analysis is to analyze the key scientific approaches to the study of the peasantry as a multifaceted social, economic and cultural phenomenon, and to determine its role in historical transformations, globalization processes and the modern world. The study reveals the main theoretical concepts proposed by the classics of peasant studies and modern scholars, which allow us to understand the evolution of the peasantry, its adaptation to changing conditions, preservation of autonomy and importance for social development.

The peasantry is one of the oldest and most important phenomena that has played a key role in the formation of civilizations, economic systems and cultural traditions. In different epochs, its study acquired new meaning, because it not only provided for the basic needs of mankind, but also became a driving force for social, political and economic change.

In the second half of the twentieth century, scholars focused on the study of the peasantry. Two peasant studies journals, 'Peasant

¹ Пайпс Р. Русская революция [пер. М. Д. Тименчик]. Москва : РОССПЭН, 1994. Ч. 1. 398 с.; Пайпс Р. Русская революция [пер. Н. И. Кигай]. Москва : РОССПЭН, 1994. Ч. 2. 584 с.

² Корновенко С., Герасименко О. Селянин-бунтар. Селянська революція в Україні 1902–1917 рр. Черкаси : Чабаненко Ю. А., 2017. С. 4–7, 32–38, 62, 141–144 та ін.

³ Михайлюк О. Селянство України в перші десятиліття ХХ ст.: Соціокультурні процеси : монографія. Дніпропетровськ : Вид-во «Інновація», 2007. 456 с.

⁴ Івангородський К. Селянство Полудневої Київщини в XVI – середині XVII ст. (Студії з етносоціальної історії). Черкаси, 2006. 144 с. С. 5–19.

⁵ Присяжнюк Ю. Українське селянство Наддніпрянської України: соціоментальна історія другої половини XIX – початку ХХ ст. Черкаси, 2007. 640 с.

⁶ Зярянук А. «Селянство» як категорія соціально-історичного аналізу (на прикладі Східної Галичини XIX ст.). *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність*. 15/2006–2007. С. 543–553.

Studies’⁷ and ‘Journal of Peasant Studies’⁸, began to be published. ‘Peasant Studies’ had been published since the 1970s, presenting key discussions on the peasantry. The journal has covered the role of the peasantry in political, economic, and social change; analyzed peasant revolutions, resistance movements, and agrarian reforms; and highlighted historical and regional studies of peasant communities. This collection laid the foundation for a systematic analysis of the peasantry as a social class, integrating economic, cultural, and historical aspects. Among the authors of the publication are Eric R. Wolf, Theodore Shanin, and James Scott.

Civilization model

The founder of the civilization approach is the German philosopher Oswald Spengler. His concept of the cyclical nature of civilizations and the “decline” of Europe influenced the analysis of traditional communities, including the peasantry. Spengler viewed the peasantry as the basis of traditional cultures and civilizations, embodying the cyclical nature of historical development. In his work “The Twilight of Europe,”⁷ he described the peasantry as a symbol of “blood and soil,” an integral part of culture. The peasantry, according to Spengler, is a carrier of “organic life” opposed to the urban “mechanics” of civilization. In his conception, peasants are the bearers of traditional values and cyclical time, which reflects the natural rhythm of life: “The peasant remains close to the land, his life revolves around natural rhythms. His work and faith form the foundation of culture, which, in turn, ensures the stability of civilization.”⁸

According to O. Spengler, significant changes begin with agriculture and agriculture itself “turns a person into a peasant:

⁷ Spengler, O. *The Decline of the West*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 510 p. URL: <https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/72344>

⁸ Ibid.

a person puts down roots in the soil he cultivates”⁹. The scientist saw a separate symbolism in the occupation of a peasant: the connection of the human soul with “Mother Earth,” harvest and death, child and a seed¹⁰. For O. Spengler, a peasant house is also a symbol of settledness. The author compared it to a plant that has taken root and calls it “property in the most sacred sense”¹¹. For O. Spengler, the peasantry is nature and society, it is not artificial¹². The scientist considered the peasantry to be an element of nature and growth, which has remained unchanged for centuries with its way of life¹³.

The socio-historical model

The socio-historical approach is represented by Theodore Shanin. He studied the social adaptation of peasants during periods of transformation, in particular in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, etc. The scientist understood the peasantry as a socio-historical phenomenon that evolves in interaction with political and economic systems. In his research, T. Shanin combined historical, sociological, and economic analysis. He interpreted the peasantry as an “inconvenient class”. He justified his position by the fact that it balances between traditional society and the requirements of modernization. He emphasized the autonomy of peasant farms and their ability to adapt: “Peasants act as a social class that combines traditional ways of production with new social challenges. They retain their autonomy, but are forced to adapt to new economic structures.”¹⁴

⁹ Шпенглер О. Закат Европы. Очерки морфологии мировой истории. Т. 2 : Всемирно-исторические перспективы. Москва, 1998. 606 с. С. 91.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Шпенглер О. Закат Европы. Очерки морфологии мировой истории. Т. 2 : Всемирно-исторические перспективы. Москва, 1998. С. 346.

¹³ Ibid. С. 347.

¹⁴ Shanin, T. *The Awkward Class: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. 360 p. URL: https://www.academia.edu/105758902/The_Awkward_Class_a_foundation_for_peasant_studies

The researcher identified four general features that give the peasantry a qualitative certainty:

- 1) family farming;
- 2) farming on land;
- 3) specific rural culture;
- 4) very low status in systems of social domination.

T. Shanin also included marginal (borderline) groups, including agricultural workers, in the peasantry. In particular, “peasant workers” are members of various agricultural cooperatives, family groups engaged in non-agricultural labor in the countryside, peasants living outside the village and usually in the suburbs of large cities, and even farmers.¹⁵

The revolutionary model

Eric R. Wolf, an Austrian anthropologist and political anthropologist who emigrated to the United States, is a representative of the revolutionary approach. His works reflect the role of peasants in revolutions and historical transformations. He analyzed the peasantry as a driving force of revolutions and social change in the global context, and also considered it in interaction with economic and political structures.

In his work “The Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century,” Eric R. Wolf examined the participation of peasants in the revolutions of the twentieth century (China, Cuba, and Mexico), emphasizing their role in social and political change. He explains in detail the participation of peasants in revolutions and reveals how their desire for land and justice becomes a driver of social change: “Peasant revolutions are not just a struggle for land, but a protest against a system that deprives them of control over their own lives.”¹⁶

¹⁵ Шанін Т. Селянство: окреслення соціологічного питання. URL: https://uamoderna.com/images/archiv/17/9_UM_17_NebestorDumka_Shanin.pdf

¹⁶ Wolf, E. R. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 356 p. URL: https://archive.org/details/PeasantWarsOfTheTwentiethCentury?utm_source=chatgpt.com

In his work *The Peasants*, Erich R. Wolf portrayed peasants as a “semi-integrated” group that balances between autonomy and dependence on the broader social and economic system. The scholar examined various approaches to the study of the peasantry, the origins of peasant communities, major agricultural adaptations, social organizations, aspects of religion and ideology, peasant movements, and the interaction of peasants with markets and other social groups.

The complexity of peasant life, their dependence on market conditions, and the constant need to balance external demands with internal needs were emphasized by the scientist in the following way: “Peasant farms function in a similar way. Of course, peasants are aware of the price of labor and goods on the market – their economic and social survival depends on it...”; ‘the eternal problem of the peasantry is to balance the demands of the outside world with the needs of the peasants themselves...’.¹⁷

Eric R. Wolf¹⁸ defined social structural “types” of peasants depending on their right to land and emphasized that the life of a peasant is determined not only by his or her internal needs, but exists within a larger system. Therefore, the efforts to meet the needs of the peasantry in each society are different. The author believed that only when the peasantry integrates into society and becomes a part of the social and political life of the state can we talk about the peasantry.

Moral-economic model

The representative of the moral-economic approach can be considered the American James Scott – a political scientist

¹⁷ Wolf, Eric R. *Peasants*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 181 p. URL: https://monoskop.org/images/9/9b/Wolf_R_Eric_Peasants_1966.pdf

¹⁸ Wolf, Eric R. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. https://archive.org/details/PeasantWarsOfTheTwentiethCentury?utm_source=chatgpt.com

and anthropologist, who is known for his analysis of peasant resistance and state intervention in agrarian communities. His research is focused on East Asia, in particular on Southeast Asia. He is the author of the concept of the "moral economy" of peasants, with which he explained their struggle for survival and resistance to unfair economic exploitation.

In the work 'The Moral Economy of Peasants', which is based on field research in rural communities of Southeast Asia, archival sources and sociological analysis, the scientist developed the concept of the "moral economy" of peasants, where their actions are motivated by the desire to survive and restore justice in economic relations: "For peasants, not only material profits are important, but also the preservation of morality, which guarantees them a minimum level of survival."¹⁹ J. Scott used the term "moral economy" to describe the traditional norms and values that regulate economic relations in peasant communities. These norms are based on the principles of justice, mutual assistance, and ensuring a minimum level of survival for each member of the community: "Peasants are oriented towards survival and risk-taking, which determines their resistance to any changes that threaten their stability."²⁰

J. Scott analyzed how the violation of the "moral economy" due to capitalist reforms, colonial interventions, or other social changes causes social tension. For example, the imposition of a money economy, the loss of traditional means of survival (for example, the right to access land or water). According to J. Scott, peasant revolts are a reaction to a threat to living standards and traditions, rather than a struggle for new ideals. He calls such actions

¹⁹ Scott, J. C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 247 p. URL: <https://dokumen.pub/the-moral-economy-of-the-peasant-rebellion-and-subsistence-in-southeast-asia-9780300185553.html>

²⁰ Ibid.

“conservative” in their essence. The work “The Moral Economy of Peasants” is important for understanding social conflicts in peasant societies.

Another work by J. Scott “Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance”²¹ is a fundamental work on the study of social resistance. The scientist has clarified the hidden, everyday forms of peasant resistance against oppression. He noted that peasants in conditions of social inequality, poverty and pressure from the elites or the state resort to hidden forms of resistance that are not always obvious to outside observers: “Peasant resistance does not necessarily have to be collective or openly declared to be effective. The “weapons of the weak” are often inconspicuous and at first glance, insignificant forms of protest.”²²

He singled out the following “everyday” methods of resistance: sabotage (deliberately slowing down work, reducing productivity), non-compliance with orders (formal submission without actual execution), rumors and sarcasm (creating an atmosphere of social condemnation for the oppressors), passive resistance (hiding the harvest, evading taxes or requisitions), economic resistance (barter transactions, smuggling, avoiding official economic channels).

Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance²³, is based on field research in the Malaysian countryside. The scientist collected data on social tensions, relations between peasants and landowners, as well as the ways in which oppressed groups defended their interests.

Cindy Mintz is also considered a representative of the moral-economic approach. The researcher from the USA found out how the global economy affected traditional agrarian communities.

²¹ Scott, J. C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. 389 p. URL: <https://archive.org/details/weapons-of-the-weak-everyday-forms-of-peasant-resistance/page/n51/mode/2up>

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

In the work “Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History”, the scientist revealed how the plantation economy, dependent on the labor of peasants, integrated them into the global economy: “The peasants who grew sugar cane were integrated into the global economic chain, but their social status remained at the level of semi-serf dependence”²⁴.

S. Mintz’s book is a classic of scientific thought, combining historical, anthropological and sociological approaches to the analysis of the impact of colonialism and the global economy on societies. It explores the role of sugar in shaping modern history, in particular in the context of colonial empires, the plantation economy and changes in consumer practices. The scientist substantiated the destructive impact of the plantation economy on peasant communities. Plantations replaced traditional forms of management, creating a dependence on monocultural production. This led to poverty, food shortages and social instability. S. Mintz traced the shift in the social significance of sugar from a luxury item for the elite to a mass product, made possible by the exploitation of labor in the colonies: “The democratization of sugar consumption in Europe was made possible by the dehumanization of labor in the colonies.”²⁵

In his opinion, sugar as a product initiated the globalization of food products. Its consumption in Europe changed the structure of nutrition, contributed to the development of capitalism and the creation of modern consumer culture. The scientist also emphasized the moral and social consequences of colonial production, in particular, the destruction of local cultures, traditions and the autonomy of communities, so he can be considered a supporter of the moral-economic approach.

²⁴ Mintz, S. W. Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History. New York: Penguin Books, 1985. 274 p. URL: https://z-lib.gs/book/713962/3edd80/sweetness-and-power.html?dsource=recommend&utm_source=chatgpt.com

²⁵ Ibid.

The focus of S. Mintz's research attention was also the peasantry itself²⁶. He noted "the fact ... that the peasantry nowhere forms a homogeneous mass or cluster, but is always and everywhere typically characterized by internal differentiation in many directions." The scientist pointed to "the need for definitions of the peasantry and peasant societies of the middle level – definitions that are somewhere in the middle between real peasant societies 'on the ground', so to speak, and the broadest level of definition sufficient to describe all of them." These definitions or typologies should be consistent with peasant classes, etc.

The economic model

Jan Dauwe van der Plugh, a contemporary scholar from the Netherlands, can be considered a representative of the economic approach to the study of peasantry. In his works, the scholar focuses on the study of modern peasant farms, their struggle for autonomy and sustainability in the globalized world, and the preservation of sustainable economic practices in the context of globalization.

The work "The New Peasantry: The Struggle for Autonomy and Sustainability in an Age of Empire and Globalization" is based on comparative research in different regions of the world: Its author has proposed a new understanding of the peasantry that goes beyond the traditional notion and focuses on its adaptation, autonomy, and sustainable development. The scholar developed the concept of the "new peasantry," arguing that despite urbanization and globalization, the peasantry is not disappearing. On the contrary, a "new peasantry" is emerging in many regions of the world, characterized by a search for autonomy, sustainable development, and resistance to agrarian capitalism. The new peasantry combines traditional agricultural practices with innovations such as organic

²⁶ Mintz, S. W. *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History*. New York: Penguin Books, 1985. 274 p. URL: https://z-lib.gs/book/713962/3edd80/sweetness-and-power.html?dssource=recommend&utm_source=chatgpt.com

farming: “The new peasantry is a counter-movement against the dominance of global capitalism in agriculture, offering alternative ways of producing food and sustaining rural life.”²⁷ The scientist described the peasantry as a dual phenomenon: as an economic class dependent on land and local resources and as a political actor fighting for autonomy and preservation of traditional farming.

Globalization, according to Jan Douwe van der Plugh, has created conditions for farmers to become more dependent on global markets, agribusiness and financial institutions. However, it has also sparked a resistance movement where farmers are choosing strategies of self-organization, rebuilding local economies, and forming alternatives to global models. The central theme of the researcher’s work is the peasants’ struggle for autonomy-the ability to control their own resources, make independent decisions, and refuse imposed production models: “Autonomy is not just independence, but the creation of sustainable alternatives to exploitative systems.”²⁸ The “new peasantry” is based on the principles of sustainable development, including ecological farming, local production, and biodiversity conservation.

Interesting are the reflections on the concepts of “peasant” and “peasantry” by Jan Douwe van der Plugh.²⁹ The scientist identified the main features of “peasant conditions”: minimal monetary expenditures, cooperative relations, and the struggle for autonomy, calling them the main ones for all countries seeking to develop

²⁷ van der Ploeg, J. D. *The New Peasantries: Struggles for Autonomy and Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization*. London: Earthscan, 2008. 320 p. URL: https://www.academia.edu/18229214/Van_der_Ploeg_Jan_Douwe_The_New_Peasantries_Struggles_for_Autonomy_and_Sustainability_in_an_Era_of_Empire_and_Globalization?utm_source=chatgpt.com

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Jan Douwe Van der Ploeg, *The New Peasantries: Struggles for Autonomy and Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization* (London: Earthscan, 2008). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259687848_The_New_Peasantries_Struggles_for_Autonomy_and_Sustainability_in_an_Era_of_Empire_and_Globalization_-_By_Jan_Douwe_van_der_Ploeg

in complex socio-economic relations. Jan Douwe van der Plugh considers the peasantry to be “ubiquitous,” meaning that the peasantry makes up two-fifths of humanity and is larger today than in any historical period.

The sociocultural model

The French scholar Pierre Bourdieu is a representative of the sociocultural approach in his studies of the peasantry. He studied peasant communities through the prism of the concept of habitus, symbolic capital, and social structures. The researcher was not a “peasant scientist” in the narrow sense; his studies revealed the socio-cultural mechanisms operating in rural communities. He studied peasant communities in Algeria, which became the basis for his analysis of social structures.

He found that the Algerian peasantry was based on traditional forms of agriculture. He described how the colonial regime destroyed these economic structures through the expropriation of land and the introduction of a capitalist economy. Peasant communities had a well-defined hierarchy, where tradition, religion, and patriarchal ties played a key role. They ensured stability and preservation of order.

P. Bourdieu emphasized that the peasants’ connection with the land is not only economic but also cultural, and therefore its destruction was traumatic for the peasants’ identity. According to the scholar, peasants played a leading role in the struggle for Algerian independence. He explained that their indignation was caused not only by material losses but also by the humiliation of their dignity and traditions. Thanks to their organization and common interests, the peasants became the main social base for the National Liberation Front. Their participation in the revolution reflected the struggle to restore the lost social order.

P. Bourdieu used the concept of habitus to explain the behavior of peasants. Habitus is shaped by cultural, economic, and social context. The Algerian peasantry was characterized by a deep

attachment to traditions and land, resistance to changes imposed from the outside, including colonial reforms, and the reproduction of traditional values even in difficult conditions of migration or revolution.³⁰

The scholar also drew attention to the psychological trauma experienced by the Algerian peasantry due to the loss of autonomy and colonial violence. These traumas affected their social behavior and attitudes toward modernization.

Marcel Mauss is a representative of the socio-cultural approach to the study of the peasantry. The French researcher studied the cultural aspects of gift and exchange in peasant communities, which influenced his understanding of their social relations. In his work "The Gift: Forms and Reasons of Exchange in Archaic Societies, he analyzed the phenomenon of gift as a social and economic mechanism in societies. The scholar noted that gifting in primitive societies is not a purely altruistic act, but includes three interrelated duties: the duty to give (gifting is a way to establish and maintain social ties), the duty to accept (refusal to accept a gift means breaking off relations or demonstrating disrespect), the duty to return (returning a gift ensures balance in relations and maintains equilibrium in society). M. Mauss cited examples from Polynesian and Melanesian cultures where gifts have a special spiritual meaning. In the Polynesian tradition, for example, a gift carries a part of the soul of the giver ('hau'), and this creates an obligation for the recipient.³¹ A gift is not just a material object, but a symbol of connection between people, which confirms social structures and interaction.

³⁰ Bourdieu, P. *The Algerians*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. 160 p. URL: https://monoskop.org/images/3/3d/Bourdieu_Pierre_The_Algerians_1962.pdf

³¹ Mauss, M. *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London: Routledge, 1990. 200 p. URL: https://files.libcom.org/files/Mauss%20-%20The%20Gift.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

He has also studied practices such as the 'Potlatch' system among the indigenous peoples of the Northwest Coast of North America. 'Potlatch' is a ceremonial exchange where large gifts or even the destruction of valuables demonstrate status and power.³² This system shows that the economy of archaic societies was built on the principles of symbolic exchange rather than on market mechanisms.

M. Moss noted that the economy of archaic societies is a "total social factual system" in which economic exchange is integrated into religion, morality, politics, and law. Giving in such societies serves as the basis of social solidarity, as exchange contributes to the formation of interdependencies.

He drew interesting conclusions about the importance of gift for understanding modern economic and social systems. He believed that even in capitalist societies, there are remnants of gift exchange (e.g., charity, informal exchanges, gifts) that emphasize the social nature of human relations. Moss's generalizations can be integrated into the study of peasant communities, as gift exchange is an important element of social life in many traditional agrarian societies. In the peasant context, gift-giving strengthens ties between families, provides social assistance (e.g., grain or livestock exchange), and shapes moral interaction. Gift-giving rituals, such as at weddings or holidays, serve as a means of maintaining social solidarity and transmitting cultural traditions.

The anti-globalization model

A representative of the anti-globalization approach to the study of the peasantry is the contemporary Colombian scholar Arturo Escobar, who has studied the impact of globalization on the peasantry, environmental sustainability and development

³² Mauss, M. *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London: Routledge, 1990. 200 p. URL: https://files.libcom.org/files/Mauss%20-%20The%20Gift.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

in Latin America and has identified the interconnectedness of the peasantry, the environment and economic development. In his work “Facing Development: The Making and Breaking of the Third World” he offered a critical analysis of the concept of development and its impact on the countries of the Global South.³³

The researcher argued that after World War II, development became the main discourse by which the West defined and controlled the countries of the Global South. The concept of the “Third World” emerged as part of this discourse, presenting entire regions as “backward” and “problematic”. Development was presented as a technical and neutral process, but in reality, it became the main mechanism that justified Western intervention in the economic, social and political systems of the Global South.

A. Escobar emphasized that the Western model of development is based on the ideas of progress, industrialization and capitalism, ignoring alternative approaches to life and economy that exist in different cultures. Under the guise of aid to the Third World, a system was created that cemented their dependence on the West through debt, transnational corporations, and control over natural resources. Institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and UN agencies became key players in spreading the development discourse. They set standards for “normal” development that were often inadequate for local contexts. A scholar who analyzed how development projects imposed standardized approaches that often destroyed traditional ways of life and led to environmental and social crises. Development policies directed resources to urbanization and industrialization, ignoring the needs of rural communities, leading to the marginalization of the peasantry and the destruction of their economic autonomy. The pace of development did not take into account the cultural specifics

³³ Escobar, A. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 290 p. URL: <https://archive.org/details/encounteringdeve00esco/page/274/mode/2up>

of the regions, which led to cultural uniformity and the loss of traditional knowledge.

A. Escobar called for rejecting the dominant development discourse and turning to local alternatives based on the knowledge and practices of the communities themselves. He proposed a model in which communities have autonomy in choosing their own development paths. An important element of alternative development is preserving the natural environment and taking into account environmental constraints.

For the researcher, rural communities are centers of resistance to colonial and postcolonial forms of domination. Traditional peasant life is an example of an alternative to the capitalist system. Peasants often possess deep ecological and social knowledge that is key to sustainable development. This knowledge, however, is ignored within the traditional development discourse. Rural communities offer models of social organization based on cooperation, solidarity, and mutual support that can serve as a model for modern approaches to development.

Mark Edelman is a representative of the anti-globalization approach. A contemporary American anthropologist, researcher of peasant movements and their struggle against economic globalization, he paid close attention to the study of the concept of “peasantry”. The scholar revealed that “peasantry” appeared at the turn of the Middle Ages and the Modern era in English to refer to the rural poor, rural residents, serfs, agricultural workers, or “common” people. The use of the verb “to peasant” in that period meant “someone like a peasant is subjugated,” i.e., “the peasantry is subjugated.” However, the earliest forms of “peasant” date back to the sixth century (French, Castilian, Catalan, Occitan, etc.) and were used to refer to rural residents, regardless of whether they were engaged in agriculture or not. The scholar considered the English word “peasant” and the French word “paysan” to be synonymous: “red neck”, ”ignorant”, ”stupid”, ”rude.” In Germany in the thirteenth

century, “peasant” meant “villain, hooligan, devil, robber, burglar, and plunderer.”³⁴

The work “Peasants Against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica” is one of the key studies of contemporary peasant movements. In it, the author focused on the role of peasant communities in the fight against globalization, especially through social movements such as ‘La Via Campesina’. M. Edelman emphasized that peasants are trying not only to preserve their economic rights, but also to protect cultural values and food security in the face of increasing globalization: “In the face of globalization, rural social movements have become key actors in defending peasants’ rights to land and food sovereignty”; ‘Peasant movements resist not only economic marginalization, but also the cultural unification that globalization imposes on rural communities’.³⁵

In “Peasant Politics in the XXI century,” the scholar analyzes the current political challenges faced by peasant movements around the world. He examines the impact of global economic changes on peasant communities and their struggle to preserve their rights and resources. The work emphasizes the importance of peasants’ participation in global forums and coalitions, such as ‘La Via Campesina’, to protect their rights: “The peasant question in the XXI century is deeply linked to issues of land rights, climate change, and food sovereignty, which are increasingly threatened by global capital.”³⁶

‘La Via Campesina’, founded in 1993 and uniting 81 countries, positions its activities as an international movement that coordinates

³⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGPleasants/MarcEdelman.pdf>

³⁵ Edelman, Marc. *Peasants Against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 368 p. URL: https://archive.org/details/peasantsagainstg0000edel?utm_source=chatgpt.com

³⁶ Edelman, Marc. *Peasant Politics of the Twenty-First Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023. 280 p. URL: <https://academic.oup.com/cornell-scholarship-online/book/56783?login=false>

peasant organizations of small and large producers, agricultural workers, etc. from Asia, Africa, America and Europe, among whose tasks is, in particular, the struggle for peasants' rights³⁷. M. Edelman considers the organization's activities productive: "La Via Campesina is a global response to the economic and environmental crises that threaten the livelihoods of farmers around the world."³⁸ In addition, the organization also works in the methodological direction: in 2009, 'La Via Campesina' developed a definition in the Declaration of the Rights of Peasants of the concept of "peasant" – "a man or woman of the earth who has a direct and special relationship with the land and nature through production, food and/or other agricultural products"³⁹.

Thus, the approaches and concepts to the study of the peasantry that we have analyzed allow us to conclude that the peasantry is the foundation of agrarian societies and largely determines their development. Regardless of the approach, research topic, origin of the scholar, or era, classical theorists such as O. Spengler and M. Moss, or modern researchers such as Jan Douwe van der Ploug, M. Edelman, considered the peasantry as an integral part of human evolution. Most concepts emphasize the ability of peasants to adapt to changing conditions, whether economic, political, social, or environmental. For example, James Scott analyzed the daily forms of resistance that allow peasants to maintain autonomy, Jan Douwe van der Plough emphasized modern practices of sustainable farming, and Oswald Spengler emphasized the traditional resilience of peasantry in the cycles of civilizations.

All scholars treat the peasantry as an element integrated into broader economic, political, and social systems. For example, Wolf

³⁷ <https://viacampesina.org/en/>

³⁸ Edelman, Marc. *Peasant Politics of the Twenty-First Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023. 280 p. URL: <https://academic.oup.com/cornell-scholarship-online/book/56783?login=false>

³⁹ <https://viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2011/03/Declaration-of-rights-of-peasants-2009.pdf>

and Edelman emphasized the role of peasants in revolutions and globalization, Theodore Shanin analyzed the peasantry as an “uncomfortable class” balancing between local autonomy and dependence on the state, and Cindy Mintz focused on the economic integration of peasants into global markets.

Scholars’ concepts often emphasize the tension between peasants’ desire to maintain autonomy and the influence of external forces (state, market, colonialism, etc.). James Scott and Theodore Shanin showed the resistance of peasants to these forces. Bourdieu and Moss emphasized the cultural mechanisms of community support. Many concepts view the peasantry as an active participant in historical transformations. For example, the role of peasants in revolutions was discussed by Wolf, peasant movements in the context of globalization by Edelman, and the role of the peasantry as a driver of social change by Theodore Shanin.

All of these concepts show that the peasantry is not only an economic class, but also a socio-cultural phenomenon that requires a multifaceted analysis. All scholars share the understanding that the peasantry is an integral part of human history and modernity. Its role in social transformations and interaction with global structures make the peasantry an important object of study for analyzing both the past and the future.

Information about the authors:

Yulia Pasichna,

PhD (History), Head of the Research Department,
Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University of Cherkasy,
Cherkasy, Ukraine

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7357-7623>

e-mail: pasichna_yulia@ukr.net

**SEIZING GRAIN FROM THE PEASANTS. GERMANY
AND THE FOOD ISSUE IN UKRAINE ON THE VERGE
OF 1917–1918**

On February 9, 1918, at a diplomatic conference in Brest-Litovsk, the Ukrainian People's Republic and the states of the Quadruple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire) signed an agreement to end the war and establish friendly relations. The agreement provided for the exchange of goods. By July 31, 1918, the parties had to sell each other "the surplus of the most important agricultural and industrial products to meet the needs of the fleeing." It was agreed that Ukraine would supply agricultural products, primarily grain. According to the protocol of February 7, 1918, which supplemented the peace treaty, the amount of Ukrainian grain exported was to be at least 1 million tons.

The peace treaty of February 9, 1918, put an end to the war between the UPR and the Quartet, but the Ukrainian state was suffering from another war at the time, with the Bolsheviks. To fight them, at the request of the UPR leadership, Germany and Austria-Hungary sent their troops to Ukraine after the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. The Austro-Hungarian and German military presence in the Ukrainian state was to guarantee its security and enable it to establish food exports.

Seeking to obtain grain from Ukraine, the leaders of the Central Powers believed that the country retained a strong export potential, just as it had before the war. German diplomat Wipert von Blücher wrote in his memoirs: "Ukraine [...] was portrayed as the breadbasket

of the old Russian Empire. As such, it had to be able to deliver a very large amount of grain for our food supply.”¹

In the absence of accurate statistics, German officials and their economic advisors relied on reports from Ukrainian diplomats representing the UPR at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, and mostly on their own assumptions and general considerations to determine the amount of grain in Ukraine that could be exported.

Speculative calculations yielded the following result. Before the war, the grain harvest in the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire amounted to about 19 million tons per year. Of this amount, about 4.8–5 million tons were exported. During the war, the export of the empire’s grain almost completely stopped. Therefore, during the four years of war (1914–1917), Ukraine should have accumulated about 20 million tons of surplus grain². Taking into account the war-related decline in grain production, German experts concluded that Ukraine’s export resource in early 1918 was between 2 and 8 million tons of grain³.

According to the Ukrainian delegation at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, this resource ranged from 1 to 3.3 million tons. However, the Ukrainian delegates assured that there was one important circumstance: almost all of the finished bread was in the hands of peasants⁴.

The German leaders took note of this warning, but still thought that in addition to peasant barns, grain was also concentrated in large warehouses, both public and private. “The fact that large-scale stocks were available seemed undeniable. Especially in Shepetivka, there

¹ Blücher, W. Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo. Erinnerungen eines Mannes aus dem zweiten Gliede. Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951. S. 20.

² Velsen, S. Deutsche Generalstabsoffiziere im 1. Weltkrieg 1914–1918. Erinnerungen. *Die Welt als Geschichte*. 1956. Heft 3–4. S. 289.

³ Blücher W. Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo. Erinnerungen eines Mannes aus dem zweiten Gliede. Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951. S. 20.

⁴ Malynovsky, B. Grain export from Ukraine: assessment of the potential during peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. *Український селянин*. 2023. № 29. С. 29–34.

must have been such [stocks] stored where they had been left by the Russian army,” General Ottokar Landwehr, one of the Austro-Hungarian leaders responsible for food supply, later recalled⁵. German officials hoped to find other large warehouses in southern Ukraine, near the Black Sea ports, the main centers of Ukrainian foreign trade.

Based on these considerations, the governments of the Central Powers drew up a general plan of how they would act to obtain grain from Ukraine. They intended to use two methods simultaneously. The first was to restore pre-war ties with grain trading firms in Ukraine and use them to purchase grain from Ukrainian producers-both what was in large warehouses and what was in small farms. “We hoped to get grain from the hands of the peasants through the mediation of Jewish traders⁶”, wrote Blücher about this plan. The first step was to acquire grain stored in large granaries. Perhaps there would be so much of it that purchases from producers would be unnecessary.

The second way: without waiting for grain trading firms to start working, the German government could also procure grain with the help of its military units, which were deployed to Ukraine as part of the armed assistance to the UPR government against the Bolsheviks. The Order of the German High Command on the purpose of the military action in Ukraine (March 3, 1918) stated: “The Rada must begin to govern the country as soon as possible. The support of the Rada [is necessary] for the implementation of the peace treaty, especially for the acquisition of life and food supplies for Germany. In addition to this, it is necessary to put the railroads into operation, to purchase and collect from the railroads the supplies intended for Germany”⁷.

⁵ Landwehr, O. Hunger. Die Erschöpfungsjahre der Mittelmächte 1917/18. Zürich, Leipzig, Wien: Amalthea-Verlag, 1931. S. 172.

⁶ Blücher, W. Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo. Erinnerungen eines Mannes aus dem zweiten Gliede. Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951. S. 20.

⁷ Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Berlin, 1942. Band 13. Die Kriegsführung im Sommer und Herbst 1917. Die Ereignisse außerhalb der Westfront bis November 1918. S. 378.

To pay for the purchased grain, German officials planned to use cash reserves of the ruble and Russian securities stored in banks in Germany and neutral countries, as well as borrowed funds. W. Blücher noted that: “The Russian securities that were to be transferred to Ukraine were to be used for payment. We estimated that the Central Powers owned another 500 to 800 million of these [assets]. More than a billion of these funds passed from the German side to the Netherlands during the war. [We] were vigilant about getting [these assets] back. In addition, it was planned to pay for the supply [of Ukrainian grain] with German machines, in particular in the way that Ukraine would take out a loan from the imperial bank intended for the purchase of machines”⁸.

Agricultural equipment and other industrial products were necessary for the exchange of goods. Ukrainian delegates at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks emphasized “Peasant farms, as the main holders of grain in Ukraine, did not need money, but lacked household items and equipment. At a meeting of Austro-Hungarian and German leaders in Berlin on February 5, 1918, dedicated to the issue of a peaceful settlement with the UPR (hereinafter Ukrainian People’s Republic), Austro-Hungarian economic expert Gustav Gratz reported the following: “The Ukrainians emphasize, however, that payment in cash will not reveal the peasants’ reserves. The peasants have a surplus of money, but not enough goods. Agricultural tools are especially needed. It is noteworthy that horseshoes cost 9 rubles”⁹.

The German and Austro-Hungarian leaders hoped that the implementation of this plan-buying grain and exchanging it for industrial goods with the help of grain trading organizations

⁸ Blücher, W. Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo. Erinnerungen eines Mannes aus dem zweiten Gliede. Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951. S. 20.

⁹ Советско-германские отношения от переговоров в Брест-Литовске до подписания Рапальского договора. Сборник документов. Москва : Политиздат, 1968. Т. 1 (1917–1918 гг.). С. 281.

and military institutions-would not take much time and would yield significant results, and that the grain thus obtained would be sufficient to overcome the food crisis in the Central Powers.

German troops began advancing through the territory of the UPR on February 18, 1918. Ten days later, Austro-Hungarian units joined the offensive. Once in Ukraine, the Allies quickly realized that their previous perceptions of the situation in the Ukrainian state only partially corresponded to reality and that the export plan based on these perceptions needed to be very significantly adjusted.

It turned out that, as the German economic experts had predicted, Ukraine did indeed have a lot of food products suitable for export-not too much, but enough to meet the needs of the Central Powers. This did not mean, however, that the export issue would be easy to resolve. The problem, as it became clear, was not the availability of grain, but the inability to get it quickly for export. The ideal option for organizing exports – to take the products in warehouses and, having paid the price agreed with the owner, send them to the Central Powers – turned out to be completely impossible.

Large warehouses did exist (for example, Ostap Lutsky, an officer in the Austrian service, mentioned in his diary 7,000 wagons of grain in Kherson¹⁰), but they were few and far between. Most private and public storage facilities were empty. “They assure me that there are no grain reserves in large estates anywhere [...]. There are no public warehouses left, and no stocks can be found among traders¹¹”, the report to Vienna said. The Bolsheviks took some of the grain from the storages to Russia, while others were looted during the riots.

Almost all of the finished bread, as the UPR representatives had warned at the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk, was at the disposal of the peasants. They were the main labor force on the estates and received about a third of the crops grown there as payment for their

¹⁰ Луцький О. Щоденник з України 1918 р. *Сучасність*. 1985. № 5. С. 91.

¹¹ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 316.

work¹². In addition, peasants were the main participants in attacks on estates and state storage facilities during the riots, and thus they got what the landlords kept for themselves after paying them as employees and what the state authorities and grain trading institutions had purchased before the riots began. Thus, in addition to their own grain (grown on their farms), as of March 1918, peasants also owned most of the grain belonging to other people, including landlords, traders, and the state.

The peasants did not keep their own grain, let alone appropriated grain, in the barns, in plain sight, but carefully hid it. Recalling peasant precautionary measures in his memoirs, General Wilhelm Groener, a representative of the German High Command in Ukraine, wrote: "Those who had anything at all hid it, as is customary in Ukraine, in large holes in the ground"¹³. And they were skillfully disguised, for example, by planting onions on top of them¹⁴.

As a result, food exports, on which the Central Powers had high hopes, were slowed down and complicated. First, exports had to be preceded by harvesting. Secondly, in carrying out this procurement, it was necessary to deal not with a few large suppliers (state institutions or private wholesalers), but with a large number of small holders. We were talking about millions of people. According to Professor Otto Auhagen, an agricultural expert who advised the German command in Ukraine, as of 1916 there were 3,657,550 peasant farms¹⁵ in the 9 Ukrainian provinces¹⁶.

¹² Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 316.

¹³ Groener W. Lebenserinnerungen. Jugend. Generalstab. Weltkrieg. Göttingen, 1957. S. 390, 391.

¹⁴ Рабочая борьба (Екатеринослав). 1918. 19 апреля.

¹⁵ The provinces that, according to the Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, formed the territory of the UNR, with Crimea, but without the four counties of Volhynia occupied as of 1916.

¹⁶ Auhagen, O. Agrarfrage in der Ukraine. *Schmollers Jahrbücher*. 1919. № 43. S. 332.

How was this procurement to be carried out? That is, how was it possible to “lure” grain from the peasants? As the experience of the first procurements showed, none of the methods used was fully effective.

At that time, there were several types of banknotes in circulation in the UPR: Russian “tsarist” rubles, Russian rubles issued in 1917 (credit cards and treasury notes, the so-called “kerenky”), and Ukrainian karbovantsy (introduced by the UPR law in January 1918). In Austria-Hungary, German military and merchants added marks, kronor, and ost-rubles (a currency introduced by the German administration in the occupied regions of the Russian Empire).

It quickly became apparent that not all types of paper money were equally suitable for procurement. “Only marks, krona, and tsarist rubles are of value as a means of payment,” one German representative noted in a report from the second half of March 1918¹⁷. “Kerenki” in Ukraine were valued much less than ‘tsarist’ rubles, and people avoided taking karbovanets altogether because due to the low quality of printing, many fakes were distributed¹⁸. There was no benefit in purchasing from the ‘ost’-ruble. Ukraine categorically refused to accept it.

So, the rubles issued in the Russian Empire before the overthrow of the monarchy had to be used for the calculation. As it turned out, there were several reasons why this was difficult. First, there was the decreasing value of money and rising prices. During the World War, as a result of the issuance of paper money in the former Russian Empire, the amount of paper money increased significantly, while its value decreased and continued to fall. Colin Ross, a German writer and traveler, liaison officer between the German diplomatic service

¹⁷ Krauss, A., Klingenbrunner, F. *Die Besetzung der Ukraine 1918. Militärverwaltung in der von österreichisch – ungarischen Truppen besetzten Gebieten*. Wien, 1928. S. 369.

¹⁸ Григор’єв Г. У старому Києві. Спогади. Київ : Радянський письменник, 1961. С. 322.

and the military command in Ukraine, noted in a report to the Eastern Front Command that during the war “the value of the ruble decreased 10 times.” So many credit cards were printed that almost all Ukrainians had tight wallets: “everyone from a simple laborer to a vagrant or a demobilized soldier has a lot of money, because for the simplest physical labor, such as unloading a railway carriage, they pay 30 to 50 karbovanets a day”¹⁹.

Money was losing value – prices were creeping up. “The value of money has decreased enormously. The closer you get to Kyiv, the higher the prices. Here [in Kyiv], bread, consisting of a small amount of wheat and rye flour, and mainly pea and bean flour, costs 70 kopecks for the smallest Russian pound”²⁰, Major Theodor Michelis, a member of the German delegation to Ukraine, reported to his superiors (March 12, 1918)²¹. Compared to the pre-war period, prices increased many times over. A pud (40 lbs.)²² of lard, for example, according to an Austro-Hungarian observer, cost 140 rubles instead of 3 rubles²³.

But that was not all. As it became known, the peasants, the main owners of grain reserves, were not at all interested in selling it. First, they, like all residents of Ukraine, anticipated that prices would rise. If they sold the grain today, they might regret it tomorrow, because prices were not going down, but up, and the future profit from the sale would surely exceed the current one. The peasants, knowing that no one else in the country had grain, according to Vice Admiral Albert Hopman, head of the Navigation and Technical Commission in Odesa, “not without reason foresaw an imminent famine,” meaning

¹⁹ Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

²⁰ Merchant pound = 409 grams, apothecary pound = 358 grams.

²¹ Archivalische Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeitsbewegung. Berlin: Rütten u. Loening, 1959. Band 4/III. S. 1243.

²² Pood = 16.38 kilograms.

²³ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 316.

that soon the demand and, consequently, the price of bread would likely become not just high, but sky-high²⁴.

Second, the peasants' lack of need for money was evident. As food prices in the Russian Empire rose during the World War, peasants significantly increased their income. In addition to selling food, they received additional sources of income, such as payments for horses and cattle requisitioned by the state and financial assistance in connection with the conscription of family members²⁵.

At the same time, the production of non-food products, such as household items and tools, declined in the Russian Empire. For example, the production of agricultural machinery in 1917 amounted to only 10% of the production in 1913²⁶. "Although agricultural machinery was imported from America and Sweden during the war, it could not meet the needs; the shortage of scythes was especially acute, with 1.68 million imported in 1914," noted Rudolf Claus, author of the book *War and the Russian Economy*²⁷.

Thus, while selling the products of their farms at a great profit and receiving additional payments from the state, the peasants were unable to spend the proceeds for several years in a row. As a result, by the spring of 1918, the villages of Ukraine, as one Austro-Hungarian observer put it, were literally "overflowing with money"²⁸. According to financial experts, Ukrainian peasants had a huge

²⁴ Hopman, A. Das ereignisreiche Leben eines "Wilhelminers". Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920 / Hgb. M. Epkenhans. München: B. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. S. 1094.

²⁵ Клаус Р. Война и народное хозяйство России (1914–1917 гг.). Москва ; Ленинград : Государственное военное издательство, 1926. С. 108.

²⁶ Советско-германские отношения от переговоров в Брест-Литовске до подписания Рапалльского договора. Сборник документов. Москва : Политиздат, 1968. Т. 1 (1917–1918 гг.). С. 526.

²⁷ Клаус Р. Война и народное хозяйство России (1914–1917 гг.). Москва ; Ленинград : Государственное военное издательство, 1926. С. 100.

²⁸ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 317.

amount of cash at their disposal – from 2 to 4 billion rubles²⁹. “Almost all the money [in Ukraine] is in their hands,” Hopman said³⁰. And this does not seem to be an exaggeration, given that the total amount of paper money in circulation in the Russian Empire at the end of 1917 was 19.574 billion rubles³¹.

Thus, the peasants accumulated a lot of paper money, which depreciated significantly and continued to lose value, and they had nothing to spend it on. Grain, on the other hand, is an expensive commodity that is always in demand and has a long shelf life. Not feeling the need for money, fearing to cheapen or, even worse, to exchange a valuable product for worthless pieces of paper, grain owners refused to put it on sale – they preferred to store it, waiting for a more favorable situation.

Or they processed the grain into alcohol, as it was several times more expensive. Since the beginning of World War I, the Russian government has significantly restricted the production and sale of vodka products. The reduction and rise in price of distilleries’ products stimulated the production of moonshine, “it was then that this product established itself in the Russian village as [...] a substitute for vodka, which had disappeared, [...] and a universal means of exchange”³².

And not only in the Russian village, but also in the Ukrainian village, as German representatives saw in early 1918. Colin Ross’s report reads: “Another reason for the reluctance to sell bread is the ban on the sale of alcohol [...]. Vodka, as well as alcohol in general, is a highly marketable commodity in Ukraine,

²⁹ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 371.

³⁰ Hopman, A. Das ereignisreiche Leben eines “Wilhelminers”. Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920 / Hgb. M. Epkenhans. München: B. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. S. 1094.

³¹ Голицын Ю. Финансы России в 1917. *Россия в 1917 году* : энциклопедия. Москва : Политическая энциклопедия, 2017. С. 1002.

³² Курукин И., Никулина Е. «Государево кабацкое дело». Очерки питейной политики и традиций в России. Москва : АСТ: ЛЮКС, 2005. С. 229, 230.

and in the cities it can only be obtained at an exorbitant price. [...] all peasants make vodka from grain. And since the highest price for grain does not exceed 18 karbovanets per pud, and 3 bottles of vodka worth 90 karbovanets can be obtained from a pud of grain, distilling vodka is a new reason for peasants not to sell grain as a food product³³.

The “home” production of vodka contributed to the growth of peasants’ prosperity because it saved money, since peasants did not spend money on its purchase, as was the case before the introduction of restrictive measures in the vodka trade³⁴.

German journalist Fritz Wertheimer wrote in a report from Kyiv on April 8, 1918: “There are no stocks in the silos and warehouses that can be taken at once. It is true that the peasants have considerable stored volumes, but they have already been reduced and are being further reduced due to the unfortunate widespread custom of feeding cattle with the best sown grain, as well as due to the [operation of] secretly erected vodka distilleries that exist in almost every household. Drunkenness in the villages is now more than ever”³⁵.

In such circumstances, when it was unprofitable to trade grain, peasants usually agreed to sell it without much desire, after a long bargaining process, and at a very high price. The appearance of German and Austro-Hungarian troops in Ukraine raised prices even further: the Ukrainian population viewed the foreign army as a bargain, able to pay three times the price for the food and supplies they needed. It was clear that these extremely high prices were not the limit, because the larger the purchases for export, the higher the peasants would raise prices, because as the total mass of grain

³³ Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

³⁴ Клаус Р. Война и народное хозяйство России (1914–1917 гг.). Москва ; Ленинград : Государственное военное издательство, 1926. С. 101.

³⁵ Frankfurter Zeitung. 1918. 13 April.

in the country was “exhausted,” each subsequent batch would be more valuable than the previous one, and therefore more expensive.

The highest price for a pud of grain, Colin Ross reported in his report, was 18 rubles in the second half of March³⁶. Thus, in order to purchase the 60 million puds/1 million tons of wheat envisaged by the February 7, 1918 protocol at prevailing market prices, the Central Powers needed more than a billion rubles in cash.

In addition to the fact that the amount was very large, the Allies simply did not have that many ruble notes. Attempts to find additional ruble cash in the Central Powers (in addition to that which had been accumulated before the military offensive) yielded unsatisfactory results. The “Ruble Syndicate,” created by the Central Powers’ governments with the participation of Austrian, Hungarian, and German banks to collect and concentrate rubles³⁷, was admittedly “relatively inefficient in its first months [of operation]”³⁸.

Attempts to compensate for the lack of ruble banknotes by borrowing from Ukraine were equally unsuccessful. As it turned out, there were almost no large accumulations of cash inside Ukraine, either with the state or with private financial institutions. The Bolsheviks, retreating to Russia, took not only grain stocks but also valuables from banks and the state treasury and, in addition, seized the ruble printing presses. The devastated state treasury of the UPR was not replenished because the population stopped paying taxes in the midst of the chaos. Thus, private and public financial institutions in Ukraine did not have the large amounts of cash needed to pay farmers for grain. Cash was concentrated

³⁶ Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

³⁷ Дорнік В., Ліб П., Расевич В. Німецька імперія та Австро-Угорщина як окупанти України 1918 р. *Україна між самовизначенням та окупацією: 1917–1922 роки*. Київ : Ніка-Центр, 2015. С. 272.

³⁸ Loewenfeld-Russ, H. *Die Regelung der Volksernährung im Kriege*. Wien: Hoelder, Pichler, Tempisky A. G., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926. S. 399.

among the population, mainly among peasants. Therefore, in order to buy grain from peasants, one had to first receive the accumulated funds from them in one way or another.

Paper marks and kronor could not be a good means of payment either. For the same reasons that rubles, marks, and kroner were needed to pay peasants, a lot of them. The disastrous consequences of large-scale use of its own currency in Ukraine were shown by the experience of Austria-Hungary. Shortly after the start of the offensive, its military units in Ukraine were provided with 100 million Krona to buy food³⁹. Hans Löwenfeld-Russ, the head of the Austrian State Food Service, wrote in his memoirs about the result: “This military special action [...] due to the heavy consumption of krona notes – the military paid with krona notes! – extremely damaged the value of our currency not only in Ukraine, but also, due to the outflow [abroad], especially to the Scandinavian and Dutch markets [...] and undoubtedly contributed to a strong fall in the krona exchange rate within a few months”⁴⁰.

In addition, it turned out that the currency ratio agreed upon during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations was, in the opinion of German representatives in the UPR, unequal, i.e., when exchanging marks and kronor for rubles to purchase bread or when paying for it directly in marks and kronor, this bread (like any other product) became even more expensive for the Allies.

In the peace treaty with the UPR, the Central Powers included the pre-war (pre-1914) exchange rate, without taking into account that the ruble had depreciated significantly during the World War. According to the peace treaty, 1000 marks were supposed to be equal

³⁹ Loewenfeld-Russ, H. *Die Regelung der Volksernährung im Kriege*. Wien: Hoelder, Pichler, Tempsky A. G., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926. S. 400; Krauss, A. *Die Besetzung der Ukraine 1918. Militärverwaltung in der von österreichisch – ungarischen Truppen besetzten Gebieten*. Wien, 1928. S. 370.

⁴⁰ Loewenfeld-Russ, H. *Im Kampf gegen Hunger*. Aus *Erinnerungen des Staatssekretär für Volksernährung. 1918–1920*. Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1986. S. 94.

to 462 rubles in gold⁴¹. In reality, paper ruble marks were worth much less in Ukraine at the beginning of 1918. A fair exchange rate, according to German observers, should have been 1:1⁴².

Experts from the Central Powers believed that it was necessary to balance the exchange rate, to bring it closer to the 1:1 level. It was also possible to try to artificially “swing” it in the other direction, to change it in favor of the mark and the krona. However, this was most likely a bad idea. One Austrian analyst noted: “The proposal to establish a forced exchange rate for the krona seems, in addition to other doubts about the circulation of millions of krona in Ukraine, a very dubious means, because it is not yet known whether the peasants will agree to sell bread against the forced exchange rate for krona and marks”⁴³.

Paper banknotes only “replace real money in circulation – gold and silver”⁴⁴. In other words, procurers could theoretically resort to exchanging grain for precious metals. The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of February 9, 1918 (Article VII, paragraph 1) stipulated that in the course of commodity exchange, “settlements were to be made in gold”⁴⁵. However, even at the stage of drafting the peace treaty, the Allies made it clear that, despite this provision, they would not actually provide gold in any case. Thus, UPR official Ivan Shafarenko, a participant in the Brest peace conference, later noted that “in private conversations, the Germans warned him that they had

⁴¹ Українська Центральна Рада. Документи і матеріали. Київ : Наукова думка, 1997. Т. 2. С. 138.

⁴² Доклад начальника Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

⁴³ Дорошенко Д. І. Історія України 1917–1923 рр. Київ : Темпора, 2002. Т. 2 : Українська Гетьманська Держава 1918 року. С. 12.

⁴⁴ Атлас 3. Деньги бумажные. *Экономическая энциклопедия. Политическая экономия*. Москва : Советская энциклопедия, 1972. Т. 1. «А» Индексы. С. 413.

⁴⁵ Українська Центральна Рада. Документи і матеріали. Київ : Наукова думка, 1997. Т. 2. С. 138.

no intention of giving their gold to Ukraine”⁴⁶. For their part, the Ukrainian delegates to the peace talks agreed not to insist on paying in gold⁴⁷.

And later, during their stay in Kyiv, representatives of the Central Powers categorically refused to even raise this issue. According to the economist Oscar Anderson, author of a book about Ukraine’s foreign trade in 1918, by the end of March it was obvious to everyone involved in determining the content of Ukrainian economic policy “that Ukraine would not receive gold”⁴⁸.

The general conclusion about the plan to buy grain at market prices and pay with paper money was that it was possible, but difficult, given the high cost and lack of credit cards, as well as the need to conduct lengthy bidding with an uncertain outcome – even after much persuasion, peasants could refuse to buy grain.

Summarizing the experience of German troops’ attempts to buy grain from the UPR at free prices, W. Groener wrote in his memoirs: “The fact was that there were no large amounts of grain in Ukraine, and what was available was hidden [...]. Given all this, Ukraine’s grain reserves were still so large that it could export without danger to itself, but not in the volume that we expected. But how could we get the Ukrainian surplus if it was not voluntarily given? Each individual peasant gave nothing because he did not want to know the money offered to him, the so-called Ost-Rouble, and he trusted only the old Tsarist Ruble, which was [...] unfavorable for us

⁴⁶ Андерсон О. Внешняя торговля Украины в 1918 году. Киев : Издательство Всероссийского центрального союза потребительных обществ, 1919. С. 27.

⁴⁷ Советско-германские отношения от переговоров в Брест-Литовске до подписания Рапалльского договора. Сборник документов. Москва : Политиздат, 1968. Т. 1 (1917–1918 гг.). С. 281.

⁴⁸ Андерсон О. Внешняя торговля Украины в 1918 году. Киев : Издательство Всероссийского центрального союза потребительных обществ, 1919. С. 27.

[according to the established exchange rate] and could be obtained only occasionally”⁴⁹.

A much better option, in fact, the optimal one, was the one that Ukrainian delegates emphasized during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and which was enshrined in the protocol of February 7, 1918: the exchange of grain for manufactured goods.

The lack of such goods among the peasants was very significant. Around Odesa, for example, according to the observation of the Austro-Hungarian military, “there was a shortage of agricultural machines and tools”⁵⁰ Therefore, the option with the exchange for household items and equipment would suit the peasants as best as possible, and, therefore, would encourage them to get grain from the warehouses and carry it to procurement points. If “even with a very high price for bread, it will be difficult to induce the peasant to sell the supplies of life in considerable quantities”, Ross noted in his report, then “he will willingly exchange them for the goods he desperately needs. First of all, these are agricultural tools, leather, dishes, clothes and boots”⁵¹.

Understanding this, the German side diligently sought goods for exchange. At first it seemed that everything would work out. During W. Groener conversation on the eve of his trip to Ukraine (March 1, 1918) with representatives of the imperial government Karl Helfferich, Hans-Karl Stein and Hilmar Bussche, they talked about the government’s intention to quickly create a material fund for commodity exchange.

⁴⁹ Groener, W. Lebenserinnerungen. Jugend. Generalstab. Weltkrieg. Göttingen, 1957. S. 390, 391.

⁵⁰ Krauss, A., Klingenbrunner, F. Die Besetzung der Ukraine 1918. *Militärverwaltung in der von österreichisch – ungarischen Truppen besetzten Gebieten*. Wien, 1928. S. 368.

⁵¹ Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

Having money to buy grain, his interlocutors told Groener, was not enough: grain was concentrated mainly among peasants, and they were not interested in cash, but household goods (“tools for their production, watches and other small necessities”). Helfferich assured Groener that the imperial government had taken this into account – the necessary preparations had already been made for industrial imports into Ukraine. After this conversation, Groener wrote in his diary: this approach to the matter is correct: “if we want to export grain from Ukraine, we must import and offer goods, if possible, quickly and not too little”⁵².

But very soon German government officials became convinced that the German industry is not capable of meeting the Ukrainian consumer’s demand for industrial products. Already in the middle of March 1918, discussing this issue with officials of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, German representatives made it clear that their country would not be able to provide not only gold, but also industrial goods. More precisely, he can, but not quickly and not at a cheap price. On March 25, 1918, at a meeting of Ukrainian officials devoted to the preparation of trade negotiations with the Central Powers, the Minister of Trade and Industry of the Ukrainian People’s Republic of Ukraine Ivan Feshchenko-Chopivsky reported that representatives of the Central Powers “come to us with demands to give them various goods; when we tell them that we should also give something, they refuse”⁵³.

The first deliveries of German goods arrived in Ukraine already under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, in May 1918. They clearly showed that Germany, after four years of war, had lost the ability to

⁵² Von Brest-Litovsk zur deutschen Novemberrevolution. Aus den Tagebüchern, Briefen und Aufzeichnungen von Alfons Paquet, Wilhelm Groener und Albert Hopman, März bis November 1918 / Hgb. von W. Baumgart. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1971. S. 262–264.

⁵³ Андерсон О. Н. Внешняя торговля Украины в 1918 году. Киев : Издательство Всероссийского центрального союза потребительных обществ, 1919. С. 28.

supply the market with quality goods at an adequate price. P. Skoropadsky wrote in his memoirs: “In the first steps, they [German government officials] organized their export trade with Ukraine very poorly [...] they created in Berlin the Ausfuhr Gesellschaft [= export company], which probably consisted of gentlemen not particularly intelligent, [...], it started with the fact that this company brought in so much of all kinds of low-quality goods, and the prices were impossible even at the present time, for example, a plow, quite simple, for a peasant, cost 300 rubles. When no one started buying from them, they were very surprised. [...] This case did not go like that”⁵⁴.

An alternative to buying at free prices could be a forced payment withdrawal – requisition. The requisitioning procedure for the purchase of goods made it possible not to take into account the owner’s desire to sell it and made it possible to set a price that the procurers considered acceptable, and not the price that the seller offered. That is, in this way it was possible to avoid a long negotiation with the seller and to prevent him from excessively inflating the price.

The government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic was inclined to carry out requisition or even, according to German officials in Ukraine, to carry out confiscation (forced free removal) as the main methods of harvesting bread for export and other state needs. In Ross’s report we read: “The council is of the opinion that the peasants illegally seized large stocks of food from state warehouses that served to supply the front. She wants to put pressure on the peasants with the help of German troops and force them to hand over their supplies”⁵⁵.

⁵⁴ Скоропадський П. Спогади. Кінець 1917 – грудень 1918. Київ ; Філадельфія, 1995. С. 247.

⁵⁵ Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

Actually, it was not only about the grain captured during the robberies, but about everything in general. Legally, the grain concentrated among the producers did not belong to them, but to the state, since Ukraine had a state grain monopoly from the time when it was part of the Russian Empire. From the spring of 1917, the law “On the transfer of bread to the disposal of the state” was in force. According to it, “the entire amount of bread, food and fodder, the harvest of the previous years, 1916 and [...] 1917, after deducting the stock [...] necessary for the food and economic needs of the owner”, was at the disposal of the state and could be “alienated only through the mediation of state food authorities”⁵⁶. The state bought bread from the producer at certain prices (fixed prices). They were prosecuted for selling grain by peasants bypassing state authorities as speculation. The bread monopoly provided for the right of the state to forcibly remove grain at set prices if the producers did not want to do it voluntarily.

The purchase prices set by the state were much lower than the market prices. In his report, on March 24, 1918, one of the members of the Austro-Hungarian trade mission to the Ukrainian People’s Republic reported that in the Kyiv province the fixed price for various types of grain varied between 6 and 6.8 rubles per pud⁵⁷, that is, for wheat, it was twice the market price – three times.

Since there was a lack of money for purchases, the heads of the UNR planned to use requisition receipts, designed to act as a substitute for money. At the meeting of March 3, 1918, the Council of People’s Ministers decided to issue such receipts as a special type of securities during the requisition “to meet the needs of the population and the German troops”. The state undertook to pay

⁵⁶ Российская революция 1917 года: власть, общество, культура. Москва : Политическая энциклопедия, 2017. Т. 1. С. 352.

⁵⁷ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band1. S. 335.

the amount specified in the receipt with profit (4% per annum from the date of issue). This financial document could be placed in a bank deposit account or transferred to other persons⁵⁸. At a meeting on March 13, 1918, the Council approved a draft resolution on the creation of special requisition commissions. They were supposed to replace various bodies that were responsible for conducting bread harvesting⁵⁹. They planned to use the militia to carry out the requisition, but still could not do without the involvement of the troops of the Central Powers.

German and Austro-Hungarian units, in addition to helping to requisition food to procurement institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic, also used requisitioning on their own. Conditions of rapid offensive often did not leave time to bargain, to persuade sellers to sell their goods. Immensely inflated prices were simply unacceptable. The German officer Hans Tintrup wrote in his memoirs that in many estates and villages, the military in Ukraine were greeted very kindly, they willingly let them spend the night, "with great readiness, without asking for payment, they treated them [...] with bread, milk, eggs, butter"⁶⁰. However, something else happened. For example, in Berdychev, where the German troops entered on February 26, 1918, they were met with a completely unfriendly reception: "The population of the city, in which [...] the Jews set the tone [...], met us with barely concealed reluctance. We [the local sellers] were searched and ripped off with all their might, and immediately after our arrival the prices shot up".⁶¹

Such conditions, noted Tintrup, pushed the soldiers to use coercion: "the merchant demanded too much from the soldier in a usurious manner, so that he exposed himself to the danger

⁵⁸ Українська Центральна Рада. Документи і матеріали. Київ : Наукова думка, 1997. Т. 2. С. 174.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Tintrup, H. Krieg in der Ukraine. Aufzeichnungen eines deutschen Offiziers. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1938. S. 19.

⁶¹ Ibid. S. 26.

that the latter would take the goods at an arbitrary price". It follows from Tintrup's story that disputes with sellers often ended that way – the military, in their opinion, had no choice but to "grab at the pistol holster"⁶².

Since the procurement requisition procedure was convenient for the military, they resorted to it more and more often, even in cases when it was possible to do without it. Requisition was a significant burden for the population. To be sure, people were unhappy that their property was being taken from them without asking their consent and providing compensation that was less than market value. March 24, 1918 Hopman reported from Odesa: "Immediately after the Austrians sent several wagons with foodstuffs after the occupation of Odesa [on March 13], there was great excitement among the population, incredible rumors about requisitions and the export of huge amounts of grain spread and, of course, are believed to be true"⁶³.

Public indignation grew all the more as enforced withdrawals were increasingly accompanied by abuse. The military sometimes took food from those who were in need, took not only the surplus from the peasants, but also what was necessary for their own consumption, even seed material. Another common violation was the payment of insufficient compensation or its absence at all – the army, using coercion, took away the products and things they needed for free, essentially robbing the peasants.

Scams with receipts for confiscated property have also become widespread. Taking advantage of the fact that the peasants did not know the German language or were illiterate at all, the army men wrote who knows what in the receipts, and instead of a seal they

⁶² Tintrup, H. Krieg in der Ukraine. Aufzeichnungen eines deutschen Offiziers. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1938. S. 26.

⁶³ Hopman, A. Das ereignisreiche Leben eines "Wilhelminers". Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920 / Hgb. M. Epkenhans. München: B. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. S. 1096, 1097.

attached a coin or a button⁶⁴. On March 19, 1918, when reporting to Berlin about the abuses committed by the German military, the head of the German delegation in Ukraine, Baron Alfons Mumm, cited as an example the case when the receipt issued to a peasant read: “a pig was obtained from a pig”⁶⁵.

The question arose as to what the dissatisfaction caused by the requisition could lead to. Coercion was supposed to generate resistance. How powerful will it be? Perhaps everything will be limited to complaints and verbal protests? Observers were struck by the humility and habit of obedience characteristic of the peasantry in general. “The nation will follow the one who will have the strength”, he wrote on April 8, 1918. in the diary of Ostap Lutsy, an officer of the Sich Riflemen Legion⁶⁶.

It was also worth taking into account that the majority of the residents of Ukraine were opposed to the chaos, that the majority of the population no longer wanted a revolution – people longed for a return to normal life and were therefore ready to make concessions and compromises, to avoid any aggravation. The interest of the peasantry in the restoration of order also gave reason to think that the village, despite its discontent, would fulfill the demands of the military and civil administrations, in particular, would give grain at fixed state prices. “Peasants [want] order and security [...]”. It is hard to bear the beginningless situation”, stated one of the Austro-Hungarian officials in mid-March 1918⁶⁷.

It seemed that by relying on the habitual peasant obedience and applying severe punishments for the slightest attempt at disobedience to preserve it, the army could nip resistance in the bud. However,

⁶⁴ Tintrup, H. Krieg in der Ukraine. Aufzeichnungen eines deutschen Offiziers. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1938. S. 15, 16.

⁶⁵ Baumgart, W. Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918. Von Brest-Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs. Wien, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1966. S. 124.

⁶⁶ Луцький О. Щоденник з України 1918 р. *Сучасність*. 1985. № 5. С. 92.

⁶⁷ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 366, 367.

by acting in this way, it was possible to get the opposite effect – not to suppress, but, on the contrary, to inflate the protests. The troops, resorting to coercion, were exposed to general hostility. Colin Ross wrote about this: "Sometimes, as German troops approached, the peasants gave the Council Commissioners food, horses, etc. However, such methods, if used for a long time, will certainly arouse the strong hatred of the peasant population towards the German troops"⁶⁸.

The habit of bowing to the authority of the authorities and respect for the law were shaken and weakened during the riots. In the words of an Austro-Hungarian observer, the peasants became restless, "without a bridle"⁶⁹. Thanks to military service, the villagers – recent soldiers of the Russian tsarist army – gained combat experience, they had a lot of weapons in their hands, which they brought from the front. "It should be borne in mind that we are dealing with a heavily armed and war-accustomed peasant population", Gopman warned in his report⁷⁰. The peasants sought peace and security, but only such peace and security "as will leave them the loot", the Austro-Hungarian observer noted⁷¹.

Conflicts during requisitions in some cases did lead to armed clashes. Thus, on April 17, 1918, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic informed Mumma about the incident in the village of Vasyny, Elizavegrad district, where "on the basis of requisition [...] An armed brawl ensued, in which 2 German soldiers and 2 peasants were killed". The German

⁶⁸ Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

⁶⁹ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 336.

⁷⁰ Hopman, A. Das ereignisreiche Leben eines "Wilhelminers". Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920 / Hgb. M. Epkenhans. München: B. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. S. 1096, 1097.

⁷¹ Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe / Hgb. von Th. Hornykiewicz. Philadelphia, 1966. Band 1. S. 366.

command imposed a large fine on the village and took ten local residents hostage⁷².

Passive resistance was much greater than active. Since the peasants carefully hid the grain, and after the spread of the publicity about the requisition they began to do so even more diligently, it was still necessary to find them before seizing the peasant stocks. When asked to sell grain at state fixed prices, the peasants often replied that they had nothing. How was it possible to find out how much surplus grain the owner had and whether he had it at all, because he did not show his reserves and denied their very existence?

The first way is to conduct a search. An armed unit was sent to the village, whose soldiers had to walk around the yards, looking for shelter. On April 22, 1918, Volodymyr Vernadsky wrote in his diary: "Here, in Poltava, the procurement [by the Ukrainian government] has been entrusted to General Bresler [...] – a Russian, a small Poltava landowner, robbed by the socialists. He is to carry out, with the help of the chief officer of the German troops, the forcible requisition of grain. Starting soon. The Germans in the province of Kyiv [...] made a tremendous impression on the peasants: with the help of dogs, they opened buried grain and pigs, and with the help of a magnitude arrow – hidden weapons"⁷³.

The second way is to assign a certain amount of grain, which an individual farmer or community had to provide under penalty of punishment, that is, to use the food appropriation. According to the norms of the grain monopoly, producers had to sell all surplus grain to the state. The appropriation provided that, since it was impossible to establish the exact amount of surplus grain, the producer should sell as much as the state needed and as much

⁷² Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади і управління України. Ф. 2592. Оп. 1. Спр. 39. Арк. 134.

⁷³ Вернадский В. И. Дневники. 1917–1921. Киев : Наукова думка, 1994. С. 75.

as the state administration believed he had and was able to sell without harm⁷⁴.

The order of removal according to this principle was as follows: the village community received an order to collect and deliver to the place of procurement a set number of products. Or another option: an armed squad arrived in the village and announced a demand to provide a set number of products, threatening to search and/or impose punishment in case of non-compliance.

This requirement was then fulfilled. "The village of Bydlivtsi [...] a Podilsk village [...] suddenly took on an unusual life [...] People rushed to the streets from all corners, and along the streets they rolled to the Maidan. On the square, just on the ground, rows and large tarred military tarpaulins were spread, and on them – in piles – wheat, rye, barley. People carried grain with plows, shovels, and shovels. Millet and buckwheat were hauled separately in sacks and dumped [...] around the potatoes mountain. There was a lack of overgrown potatoes. In the very heart of the square, around the scale, there are loose rolls of lard on trucks. The lard was also taken no thinner than three fingers – it was not accepted with pride. A German with a bayonet on a rifle stood around each row or truck. Along the streets, the Germans ran in twos, jumped into the courtyards and jabbed the clumsy with their bayonets. The edge of the cemetery in gray covers [...] four machine guns and eight more Germans near them. The German officers huddled around the scales, and with the reserves [...] a government commission from the Central Council. [...] Some of the people who had already handed in theirs stood aside, looked at the receipt and remained silent [...]. The public comrade [= cattle herder] [...] did not have land [...], but the commission issued him twenty kilos [= kilograms] of barley [...]"

⁷⁴ Ли Л. Хлебная монополия и трансформация сельского хозяйства. *Критический словарь русской революции: 1917–1921*. Санкт-Петербург : Нестор-История, 2014. С. 607.

he borrowed from people and brought it in his own shirt from his body”⁷⁵.

But if the peasants did not agree to hand over grain, claimed that they did not have it, what about the region? Here the military often resorted to repression. For example, as reported by the newspaper *Rabochaya Borba* (an organ of the Menshevik Party, Katerynoslav), on April 22, 1918, in the village of Solone, Katerynoslav County, an Austrian officer, the head of the commandant in the German village (colony) Mykolaifeld (Mykolaipol, now Mykolay-Pole), without receiving from the village board of information about the surplus food available in the village, ordered the soldiers to seize the grain that the villagers had brought for threshing. "The whole village panicked, and many villagers rushed to the mill to save their last bread. [...] But the commandant [...] showed his “power”. Stomping his feet, he shouted that he would bring cannons and blow the whole village to pieces if anyone took even one pood from the mill. In the end, the matter was resolved through the mediation of a local German landowner: “the commandant made concessions and ordered that the peasants voluntarily deliver all the surplus bread, lard, butter, eggs and ham the next day, because otherwise he would go around the village and then take all the grain. He left the bread that was in the mill in place”⁷⁶.

Therefore, the procedure for harvesting grain by forced removal had numerous defects. For its implementation, large forces were needed – large search teams, as well as detachments to fight the participants of armed demonstrations. It was obvious that the suppression of these speeches would have negative consequences – it would lead to casualties on both sides, change the attitude of the Ukrainian society towards the allied forces (they

⁷⁵ Смолич Ю. Інтервенція. *Вся влада Радам! Революційні події 1917–1920 рр. на Україні. Вірші. Оповідання. Нариси. Фейлетони*. Київ : Державне видавництво художньої літератури, 1957. С. 373.

⁷⁶ Рабочая борьба (Екатеринослав) 1918. 26 апреля.

will turn from aid forces into extortionists and oppressors), spoil the relationship between Germany and Ukraine, create a bad impression in the world and in the Central Powers themselves (it will have “severe consequences in the field of international relations and in our own country”⁷⁷), will prevent German business from creating strong positions in the economy of Ukraine.

There will still be little grain harvested under such conditions. On March 18, 1918, in a letter to Admiral Hennig Holtzendorff, Chief of the German General Naval Staff, Albert Ballin, CEO of the Hamburg-America Line Company, stated: “Any coercive organization, and above all a military one, will try to act [in Ukraine] with strict measures, and this will lead to the fact that all strata of the population will only become even more stubborn. [...] Thus, military intervention would probably lead to a war with gangs and destroy all prospects for economic development”⁷⁸. In view of these considerations, it was worth abandoning the bet on coercion. According to Colin Ross, it seemed “much more expedient to obtain food supplies from the peasants in kind”⁷⁹.

Thus, as it turned out during March 1918, Germany and Austria-Hungary had continuous problems with the organization of grain exports from Ukraine. If, after his meeting with Helfferich and Bussche on March 1, 1918, Gröner had the impression that Ukrainian food exports to Germany, despite certain difficulties, would still be successful, then three weeks later, on March 18, 1918, Albert Ballin reported to Holtzendorff about the general pessimism about it: “according to the data that [...] I cannot judge how true these reports

⁷⁷ Дорошенко Д. І. Історія України 1917–1923 рр. Київ : Темпора, 2002. Т. 2 : Українська Гетьманська Держава 1918 року. С. 11.

⁷⁸ Советско-германские отношения от переговоров в Брест-Литовске до подписания Рапалльского договора. Сборник документов. Москва : Политиздат, 1968. Т. 1 (1917–1918 гг.). С. 501.

⁷⁹ Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года. *Архив русской революции*. Москва : Терра, 1991. Т. 1. С. 292.

are, but, in any case, they coincide with what I hear from everywhere, that is, that so far the so-called grain peace with Ukraine has caused bitter disappointment”⁸⁰.

However, the German leaders, despite the difficulties encountered, decided not to refuse to carry out grain exports from Ukraine in the first half of 1918. Such a refusal would be a completely logical step – because under the conditions when there were no effective means to seize grain from the monopoly owner (peasants), it seemed b, there was no other choice but to stop trying to do this, or rather, to be satisfied with what was obtained, and to cancel the obligation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic to provide at least 1 million tons.

This was the position of the Ukrainian authorities at that time. At the beginning of the trade negotiations in Kyiv on March 28, 1918, the head of the Ukrainian delegation, Mykola Porsh, expressed it as follows: "After the Treaty of Brest [...] events took place that significantly changed the entire situation in Ukraine. Three months, during which the government hoped to make the main procurement of bread, were lost; the country’s financial apparatus was destroyed, money was taken out of banks, securities were destroyed [...], military stocks [...] were looted, and transport was destroyed. In addition, on leaving, the Bolshevik authorities raised to 15 rubles per pud firm prices for bread, which until now have to be reduced due to the general dissatisfaction of the population. [...] Ukrainians will give the central powers everything they can give, but please do not ignore the fact that 1) a lot of time has been lost and that 2) the government apparatus for collecting bread needs to be streamlined. They ask to be allowed, if they do not fulfill all

⁸⁰ Советско-германские отношения от переговоров в Брест-Литовске до подписания Рапалльского договора. Сборник документов. Москва : Политиздат, 1968. Т. 1 (1917–1918 гг.). С. 501.

their obligations by July 31, to replace the undelivered products with other products⁸¹.

Nevertheless, the Allies did not agree with this proposal and further emphasized that the export was a complete matter – 1 million tons of export grain was available in Ukraine and could be harvested.

How was it necessary to act in order to obtain such a quantity of grain for export? Among the German specialists, there were various proposals on how to interest the peasants in the sale of grain. For example, they discussed the idea of issuing them warrants for the purchase of certain industrial products later⁸² (when the import will be established), or to partially issue paper money in payment for the purchased grain, and partially, for encouragement, household items, vodka drinks, coins made of precious metals⁸³.

There also were exotic approaches. They mentioned, for example, the colonial experience of Great Britain, which in the second half of the 19th century. contributed to the spread of opium in China, seeking to create mass drug addiction there and thus create conditions for equivalent trade. Tea, silk and other exclusive Chinese goods to be received in exchange for opium from the British possessions in India (this move was caused by the fact that the self-sufficient Chinese society at the time was not interested in goods from Europe, and Great Britain paid for exports from China in silver, losing a large part of its fund of precious metals)⁸⁴. The ingenious Colin Ross proposed to do something similar in Ukraine: “by teaching them new

⁸¹ Андерсон О. Н. Внешняя торговля Украины в 1918 году. Киев : Издательство Всероссийского центрального союза потребительных обществ, 1919. С. 31; Пригуляк П. П. Україна і Брестський мир: від підписання до виконання (1917–1918 рр.). Київ, 2004. С. 105.

⁸² Дорнік В., Ліб П., Расевич В. Німецька імперія та Австро-Угорщина як окупанти України 1918 р. *Україна між самовизначенням та окупацією: 1917–1922 роки*. Київ : Ніка-Центр, 2015. С. 267.

⁸³ Mędrzecki W. Niemiecka interwencja militarna na Ukrainie w 1918 roku. Warszawa, 2000. S. 143.

⁸⁴ История Китая. Москва : Издательство МГУ ; Издательский дом «Оникс 21 век», 2004. С. 296–305.

harmful habits, such as smoking opium”, Ukrainian peasants might be able to be encouraged to sell grain⁸⁵.

But in the end, a product was found that would definitely attract the peasants – land. Since the end of 1917, an agrarian reform has been underway in the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which provided for the abolition of land ownership and the transfer of land plots seized by the state from large owners (landlords and wealthy peasants) to landless and landless citizens. Many landowners’ lands on the border of 1917–1918 really passed into the hands of the peasants. One part is based on the law on agrarian reform, the other part is due to arbitrary seizure.

German experts proposed to amend the law on land reform – to restore ownership of land and organize a large-scale campaign to sell landowners’ land to peasants. This measure made it possible to move from the dead point of harvesting grain for export to the Central Powers, because it created a motive for the peasants to sell their hidden stocks, because in this way they could get more money for the purchase of land plots. At the same time, thanks to these commercial transactions, paper rubles would be removed from peasant caches and returned to circulation⁸⁶.

In the note on the agrarian issue drawn up by German diplomats, the following arguments were presented in favor of the partial sale of the landlord’s land: “The Ukrainian government needs to point out during the negotiations about this proposal that it helps to eliminate the financial crisis. The country has no currency, as the villagers have hidden them. According to the information collected from all sides, the peasants will agree to spend their money not only to buy new land, but also to secure their property rights, [i.e.] they are ready

⁸⁵ Дорнік В., Ліб П., Расевич В. Німецька імперія та Австро-Угорщина як окупанти України 1918 р. *Україна між самовизначенням та окупацією: 1917–1922 роки*. Київ : Ніка-Центр, 2015. С. 267.

⁸⁶ Малиновський Б. В. Аграрна політика Австро-Угорщини й Німеччини в Україні (1918 р.). *Селянство, земля і влада в період Української революції (1917–1921 рр.)*. Черкаси, 2020. С. 184, 185.

to pay for the land they have already taken by force. If the government agrees to such a purchase of land, then the money will pass from the hands of the peasants to the landlords, and from the latter (since they are at too high an economic level to hide paper money) will pass into general circulation. Thanks to this, the shortage of currency notes that currently exists will be eliminated, and in addition, a rich source of income will be provided for the government, since it can, for example, impose a large tax (10–20%) on the merchant”⁸⁷.

The funds received by the government from the sale of land, it could lend to the Central Powers for the purchase of grain. Therefore, if this plan were implemented, everything would turn out to the benefit of all interested parties: the peasants would willingly sell grain, because they needed cash, and the Central Powers would buy grain from them without difficulty, because they would have the necessary cash.

Thus, at the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk in February 1918, the delegates of the Central Powers and Ukraine agreed on the supply of Ukrainian grain in exchange for German, Austrian and Hungarian industrial products. Ukraine has pledged to sell at least 1 million tons of grain within six months. After the beginning of procurement measures in the spring of 1918, it turned out that the country was able to fulfill these obligations – it had such a number of surpluses suitable for export, but it was complicated by the fact that almost all grain stocks were in the hands of peasants, who, having large sums of cash, were not interested in selling their reserves. Having tried various methods of seizing grain from the peasants (buying at market prices, requisitioning at fixed prices), the representatives of the Central Powers determined the best way – to exchange grain for manufactured goods. However, due to the lack of such goods in Germany and Austria-Hungary, another option was considered

⁸⁷ Крах германской оккупации на Украине (По документам оккупантов). Москва : Государственное издательство, 1936. С. 28, 29.

more effective: to offer the Ukrainian government to make changes to its agrarian policy instead of the free transfer of estate lands to the peasants, which the government had started, to sell this land to the peasants, so that they would have to sell the hidden grain in search of funds to buy it.

Information about the authors:

Borys Malynovsky,

Candidate of Historical Science, Associate Prof., postdoctoral,
Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University of Cherkasy,
Cherkasy, Ukraine

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1104-6007>
malinovskiyboris73@gmail.com

**REVOLUTIONARY YEARS OF 1917–1920:
THE REALIZATION OF THE SOCIO-CULTURAL NATURE
OF THE UKRAINIAN PEASANTRY**

In the context of the revolutionary transformations, the aspirations, moral and ethical traits, and social values of the Ukrainian peasantry were mobilized and realized. The mass behavior of the peasantry in 1917–1920, the deep features of the economic and political culture of Ukrainian farmers and their ethno-cultural characteristics determined the general background and consequences of social processes, and determined the essence of the revolutionary transformations in Dnipro valley, Ukraine.

In the context of the revolutionary transformations of 1917–1920, the peasantry came to the conditions of the revolutionary changes with economic ideas formed over a long period of time in traditional society. The central place in them was occupied by the primordial ways of solving economic and material issues that had been passed down from generation to generation. In the conditions of 1917–1920, Ukrainian farmers saw the possibility of realizing their dream ideal of life based on their right to land, free disposal of it according to their own ideas and the results of their work, and solving the long-suffering problem of satisfying the food needs. The peasants saw the transfer of landowners' land to them as a direct way to achieve the socioeconomic ideal.

The idea of the illegitimacy of the existence of large land ownership by privileged classes and, at the same time, the right of peasants to landlords' land was formed in the historical past and has passed through centuries of peasant history. The existence

of small peasant-Cossack land tenure in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during the era of the Khmelnytsky and Hetmanate, developed a socially significant idea of land ownership and the results of economic activity on it. M. Hrushevsky pointed out that the peasantry at that time sought “guarantees of their personal and estate rights, the right to land, the right to labor and its results”¹. With the change of generations of Ukrainian farmers, socio-economic aspirations were characterized by stability, as they reflected real ways to ensure material well-being, adequate to their cultural and technical capabilities, and most importantly, they could not but preserve in the social memory of the peasantry the fact that the noble landlords owned former peasant lands—that is, lands seized “illegally”, at one time taken away from the peasants. Therefore, in the first half of the nineteenth century, according to O. Kryzhanivska’s research, the peasantry had claims and encroached on landowners’ lands². In the second half of the same nineteenth century, a similar situation was observed. M. Drahomanov noted the reliability of the historical memory of Ukrainian farmers. “Until recently, there were people in Ukraine,” the scholar wrote, “who remembered how free people living on lordly lands were registered as serfs, how lands with free people were distributed to lords. And then he pointed out that “all over Ukraine they remember that this was done by Tsarina Catherine”³.

On the eve of the revolutionary events of 1917–1920, the mass perception that landed property belonged to the peasantry was noted by the empire’s law enforcement agencies. Thus, as of 1912, according to the police, rumors about the transfer of landowners’

¹ Грушевський М. Історія України-Руси. В 11-х кн., 12-ти тт. Т. VII. Київ : Наукова думка, 1995. С. 270.

² Крижанівська О. Соціальні настрої та уявлення селян Правобережної України у 20–50-х рр. XIX ст. *Український історичний журнал*. 2007. № 2. С. 130–142.

³ Драгоманов М. Українські селяне в неспокоїні роки (1880–1882). *Громада. Українська збірка*. 1882. № 5. С. 247–248.

estates to peasants were actively spreading on the Right Bank of Ukraine. At the same time, the lack of confirmation of such expectations caused farmers to become angry with the authorities. "...in their opinion", one official document stated, "they alone have the right to receive income from the land. As such ideals of the peasantry are not realized and do not find the desired support in the State Duma, a casual but fully expressive feeling of anger grows against all those who ... prevent the realization of their long-held dream⁴".

Historically formed claims to landlord property were reinforced by the traditional way of life. The dominance of the patriarchal way of life, as stated in the scientific literature⁵, dictated the nature of economic activity aimed at providing food with the help of traditional means of labor. In such circumstances, the solution to material problems in the peasants' perceptions depended not on the level of agricultural machinery, methods of soil cultivation, plant and animal breeding, but primarily on the amount of physical effort and land at their disposal. Such perceptions, in turn, formed a high social value of physical labor in the peasant environment, and thus claims to land, since it is muscle effort, according to farmers, that only causes the appearance of food. Therefore, only those who directly cultivate the land have the right to it. The peasantry also used this logic to explain the absence of moral and other grounds for the existence of landlords' right to land ownership, since it is not them, the landlords, who cultivate the land and put physical labor into it.

⁴ Центральний державний історичний архів України у місті Києві (далі – ЦДІАК). Ф. 442. Оп. 861. Од. зб. 259. Ч. 1. Арк. 12, 22 та ін.

⁵ Михайлюк О. Селянство України в перші десятиліття XX ст.: соціокультурні процеси. Дніпропетровськ: Інновація, 2007. 456 с.; Присяжнюк Ю. Українське селянство Наддніпрянської України: соціоментальна історія другої половини XIX – початку XX ст. Черкаси: Вертикаль, 2007. 640 с.

By the point of view of S. Kornovenko and O. Gerasimenko, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of the process of its “self-identification”, that is, by the version of deep self-knowledge, the peasant mass formed a spiritual and cultural quality, which led to the emergence of a new type of peasant – the “peasant-ideomaniac”. The latter is interpreted as “excited by ideas” – focused on the problems of his livelihood and their solution by “returning” the landlord’s property. Such an emotional and psychological state of the peasant stratum led to readiness for radical actions and revolutionary behavior⁶.

Anyway, in the conditions of the revolution, there were opportunities to realize the aspirations determined by the mass social culture of the peasantry. At the All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress, which took place on May 28 – June 2, 1917, Ukrainian farmers openly announced their socio-economic goals. The Peasants’ Congress opposed the existence of private ownership of land, demanded the liquidation of landlord land ownership and the transfer of all land areas to peasants to meet their consumer needs based on personal cultivation of the land. The congress declared that the land resources of the country “without redemption” will become “the property of the whole people”, and the land “should be used ... only by those who will cultivate it with their own hands” – that is, only the peasants. The participants of the congress, based on the logic generally accepted by the peasants, decided that the land area per household “must be no less than for consumption and no more for labor”⁷. The peasants-deputies of the All-Ukrainian Peasants’ Forum regarded their vision of solving the land issue as unconditional. Although they agreed that the final decision should be made

⁶ Корновенко С., Герасименко О. Селянин-бунтар. Селянська революція в Україні 1902–1917 рр. Черкаси : Чабаненко Ю. А., 2017. С. 4–7, 32–38, 62, 141–144 та ін.

⁷ Хміль І. Перший Всеукраїнський селянський з’їзд (28 травня – 2 червня 1917 р.). Київ : Поліграф. д-ця Ін-ту історії України НАН України, 1992. С. 23–24.

by the Constituent Assembly, they pointed out the necessity of implementing their approach to agrarian problems. In this regard, the resolutions of the congress stated: “The All-Russian Constituent Assembly must approve all this”⁸. That is, the peasantry declared that it would be able to put up with only those decisions of the authorities that correspond to its expectations.

Further revolutionary events confirmed the consistency of the peasantry in this position. Ukrainian farmers demonstrated the ability not only to resolve the land issue by means of peaceful political struggle, political and legal methods, but also by force during 1917–1920. Not recognizing the right of private property for landlords and wealthy peasants, the peasantry aggressively claimed land themselves. The peasantry did not distinguish between such phenomena as ownership, possession, and use⁹. They saw land in the appropriate amount as an indispensable part of a peasant household for farming and feeding. For the peasantry, the land issue was a matter of legal morality and the culture of economic and material life developed in their environment – the right to the usual way of activity aimed at subsistence. At the same time, the legal and economic culture cultivated by the state and urban civilization was not perceived by the peasantry and did not become a guide.

All segments of the peasantry were in favor of taking away landed property and transferring it to the peasants. This fact has been noted by a number of authoritative historians, both past and present. A participant in the revolutionary events of the first decades of the twentieth century, historian A. Shestakov noted that not only small-landed and poor peasants were in favor of redistribution of landowners’ property, but also wealthy farmers. “...in many cases”,

⁸ Хміль І. Перший Всеукраїнський селянський з’їзд (28 травня – 2 червня 1917 р.). Київ : Поліграф. д-ця Ін-ту історії України НАН України, 1992. С. 23.

⁹ Коріненко П., Баран Б. Правові засади земельних відносин в українському селі в першій половині XX ст. Історичний аспект. Тернопіль : ТНПУ ім. В. Гнатюка, 2021. С. 68.

he noted, “the initiators of the movement were not the poor, but middle and wealthy peasants – up to the kulaks, ... interested in expanding land at the expense of the landlord”¹⁰. The well-known Soviet historian M. Pokrovsky generally believed that the idea of transferring landowners’ estates to the peasantry and independent management of the land was a characteristic feature of the consciousness of all strata of the peasantry of the East Slavic peoples for several centuries: “...the aspiration of the peasant to become a small independent producer...” – ‘This is the core of the entire Russian agrarian history, starting... from the sixteenth century, if not earlier,’ he noted¹¹.

Modern Ukrainian historians O. Mykhailiuk and P. Korinenko ascertain the common peasant nature of the aspiration to “self-grabbing of lands”. They note that wealthy peasants were more active in seizing landlord property¹². However, as P. Korinenko points out, representatives of different strata could have specific approaches to the problem of distribution of land areas taken from landowners. The poor peasantry believed that it was fair to divide the landlord’s land according to the number of eaters, and wealthy owners demanded a division according to the number of working cattle in the household¹³. But in the vortex of bloody social struggle, the last position quickly lost its effectiveness.

¹⁰ Шестаков А. Крестьянская революция 1905–1907 гг. Москва ; Ленинград : Госиздат, 1926. С. 16, 18.

¹¹ Покровский М. Очерки русского революционного движения XIX–XX вв. Лекции, читанные на курсах секретарей уездных комитетов РКП(б) зимой 1923–1924 гг. Москва : Красная новь, 1924. С. 8–9.

¹² Михайлюк О. Селянство України в перші десятиліття XX ст.: соціокультурні процеси. Дніпропетровськ : Інновація, 2007. С. 325; Коріненко П. Земельне питання в історичній долі українського селянства. Погляд крізь віки. Тернопіль : ТНПУ ім. В. Гнатюка, 2022. С. 82–83.

¹³ Коріненко П., Баран Б. Правові засади земельних відносин в українському селі в першій половині XX ст. Історичний аспект. Тернопіль : ТНПУ ім. В. Гнатюка, 2021. С. 64.

Ukrainian farmers dreamed of realizing their economic aspirations based on the decisions of the state authorities. However, the dreams were not fulfilled, and the “agrarian passion”, as noted in 1906 by a contemporary of the events regarding the state of the peasantry, only progressed¹⁴. According to police documents, the peasantry had a “completely distinct feeling of embitterment¹⁵”, which was realized in the conditions of 1917–1920.

Obviously, it is no accident that historians characterize the socio-psychological state of Ukrainian farmers during the revolution and the behavior caused by it with the concepts of “social banditry”¹⁶, “militarization of consciousness”¹⁷, “peasant-ideomaniac”¹⁸, which in general appear to be the driving mechanism of the mass aggressive struggle of the peasants for the realization of their vision socio-economic justice and achievement of the ideal of economic life.

The specified psychological and emotional state, which was not only a product of the revolutionary era, but also a long-term cultural and ethical progress of the peasantry, and reflected in the above concepts proposed by historians, determined the social self-sufficiency of the peasantry in revolutionary transformations in the field of agrarian relations, led to a completely independent the process of sequestration of landlord land by the peasantry and its redistribution in accordance with the desired order. In 1922, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR conducted a special survey to find out the circumstances of the liquidation of landlord land ownership. It covered the inhabitants of more than 3,000 settlements and more than a million peasant households – 24.4% of their number.

¹⁴ Херсонец. Аграрные очерки. *Украинский вестник*. 1906. № 14. С. 942.

¹⁵ ЦДІАК. Ф. 442. Оп. 861. Од. зб. 259. Частина 1. Арк. 12, 22 та ін.

¹⁶ Михайлюк О. Селянство України в перші десятиліття XX ст.: соціокультурні процеси. Дніпропетровськ : Інновація, 2007. С. 342 та ін.

¹⁷ Коріненко П. Земельне питання в історичній долі українського селянства. Погляд крізь віки. Тернопіль : ТНПУ ім. В. Гнатюка, 2022. С. 82–83.

¹⁸ Корновенко С., Герасименко О. Селянин-бунтар. Селянська революція в Україні 1902–1917 рр. Черкаси : Чабаненко Ю. А., 2017. С. 4–7, 32–38, 62, 141–144 та ін.

The results of the survey showed that agrarian transformations in the period 1917–1920 were carried out by the peasantry in general in a “purely ... spontaneous situation” – i.e., spontaneously, without control by the state authorities or an external regime in relation to the countryside. In 27% of cases – “through individual or group passions”. 62% – “with the help of land committees”. But the latter – the land committees – according to the materials of the survey: “they could not change the existing order, but only directed it in a calmer direction”. As a result, the land committees only authorized the arbitrary seizure of landowners’ estates by Ukrainian farmers¹⁹. The economic culture of the peasantry turned out to be a sufficient value-ideological and ethical resource for the implementation of agrarian transformations of a revolutionary nature.

However, the redistribution of landowners’ property did not bring radical relief. The economic culture of Ukrainian farmers had the peculiarity that it did not rely too much on scientific knowledge, but also on basic awareness of agriculture. On the eve of 1917, the majority of land was already owned by the peasantry – 57%. Landlords owned much less – only 43% of the land²⁰.

In such a situation, there was land to distribute among peasant farms, but the amount of land was not sufficient to enrich farmers in a fundamental way. As a result of the revolutionary transformations, the area of peasant land use increased by 13,193,330 deses, which were added to the 19,395,602 deses owned by peasants since pre-revolutionary times²¹. Thus, the volume of peasant land increased significantly – more than one and a half times – at the expense of landlords. However, apparently, in practice, having realized that the former landlord’s property was not enough,

¹⁹ Якиманский В. К итогам аграрной революции на Украине по данным анкетного обследования 1922 года. Харьков : Типо-литогр. В-РС УВО им. Фрунзе [1924]. С. 1–3, 25–27.

²⁰ Підсумки аграрної революції на Україні. Харків : б. в., 1923. С. 2 та ін.

²¹ Ibid. С. 2.

or because they felt capable of acquiring even more land, peasants rushed to divide the land among themselves. According to some estimates, approximately 4.5 million hectares were redistributed within peasant land use. About 10% of the peasant owners lost almost half of their land allotments in the revolutionary transformations. As a result, the revolutionized part of the peasantry, involved in the radical redistribution of property, acquired a total of 19.8 million hectares, about 45.5% of Ukraine's land area²², and thus almost doubled its land supply. This was the result of many years of bloody struggle, which obviously does not seem to be an adequate price for sacrificial participation in the revolutionary bloody cataclysm. The mass economic culture of the peasantry of those times clearly did not exclude cruelty, social vengeance, and recklessness in solving material problems.

However, not only primitive and archaic ideas and values determined the behavior of the Ukrainian peasantry. On the eve of the revolution, specialists in the field of agrarian issues noted the emergence of a new type of peasant-owner in a cultural sense, who showed complete commitment to modernization, the use of the latest technology, the selection of plants and animals, and the advanced organization of work²³. This layer was not progressive, but it was known even in the 1920s²⁴, that is, it did not disappear in the vortex of armed struggle of the revolutionary era. However, the most visible manifestation of the latest modernization trends in the countryside were cooperative forms of management. Cooperation in Trans-Dnieper Ukraine during the revolution had a mass character, during 1917–1920. the number of members

²² Белонін М., Гаража М. Характеристика землевпорядження на Україні. *Український землевпорядник*. 1928. № 7. С. 11.

²³ До нових хліборобів. *Хлібороб*. 1911. № 7. С. 383–385; Гладченко А. Отчего так малы крестьянские урожаи? *Южное хозяйство*. 1914. № 7. С. 249.

²⁴ Чубар В. Я. Шляхом усупільнення до збільшення врожайності. Відповідь тов. В. Я. Чубаря на селянські листи. *Радянський селянин*. 1928. № 1. С. 5.

of cooperative societies approached 7 million. Participants²⁵, served up to 20 mln people²⁶. According to various calculations, it provided at least 28% or 32% of the turnover, and according to some data, the share in the turnover even reached 40% or 46%²⁷. In terms of its social composition, the cooperative generally had a peasant character. 88.7% of the most massive type of consumer cooperatives, which accounted for 74% of the total number of cooperatives, united rural residents²⁸.

Cooperative farming was a form of adaptation to modernization, commodity production, and the market economy. Participation in the process of economic activity on a cooperative basis fostered a commitment to innovation, a desire for commodity production, personal responsibility for one's actions, and at the same time the ability to work in a team. Cooperation during the revolution was a continuation of the cooperative progress of pre-revolutionary times. In the context of the revolutionary upheavals, peasant cooperation not only withstood the brutal tests of bloodshed, destruction of its infrastructure, transportation, and the destructive policies of various regimes, but also became a way of economic salvation. The socio-cultural features formed by cooperative activity have already become sustainable and were implemented in the everyday practice of economic life. This ensured the further post-revolutionary progress of the peasantry towards economic modernization and cultural emancipation.

The economic culture of the peasant stratum, shaped by the specifics of historical development, was based on mass

²⁵ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України (далі – ЦДАВО). Ф. 206. Оп. 1. Спр. 195. Арк. 6.

²⁶ Мохор П. Од Баліна до Леніна. Етапи розвитку кооперативної думки на Україні. Київ : Книгоспілка, 1924. С. 64.

²⁷ Фомицкий В. Кооперация в условиях НЭПа. *Українська кооперація*. 1923. № 1–2. С. 51.

²⁷ ЦДАВО. Ф. 206. Оп. 1. Спр. 195. Арк. 4.

²⁸ Ibid.

perceptions of social justice. These ideas were of a general peasant nature and did not depend on the property level of the peasants. They viewed the large landed property of noble landlords, as well as wealthy peasants, as an immoral phenomenon caused by the confiscation of land from the peasantry in the past and the lack of participation of large owners in labor. According to the peasantry, only labor on the land and the need to meet food needs gave them the right to land. The way the peasantry distributed landed property was determined by the logic of subsistence farming and food. The share of the landowner's property that could be claimed depended on the number of household members.

The economic culture of the peasantry became a value guide in the revolutionary struggle, justifying the elimination of landownership and leading to mass actions aimed at socio-economic transformation, sometimes violent and brutal, in accordance with the economic ideals of the peasantry.

The economic perceptions of the peasantry are a product of traditional culture. In the context of modernization trends and the revolution, farmers implemented transformation scenarios available to them that would allow them to adapt and provide themselves with food in the new conditions of socio-economic life based on commodity-money relations, using means they understood – expanding the area of land use. The economic culture of the peasantry was generally not associated with aspirations for modernization, but only with its physical preservation.

During the revolution, the traditional economic culture of the peasantry, acquired over the centuries, dominated and was implemented. However, in the tumultuous and bloody process of realizing the most cherished dreams of material and economic well-being, innovative segments of the economic outlook were preserved, which organically continued their progress and affected the modernization of socio-economic life in the post-revolutionary era.

A characteristic feature of the political behavior of the peasantry during the revolutionary struggle was the mobilization of the traditions of the Cossack times. The connection between the peasant uprising and the Cossacks was quite visible to contemporaries of the revolutionary events of 1917–1920. A participant in a congress of representatives of peasant armed groups operating in the area of Cherkasy in the Kyiv region in 1919 noted their incredible similarity to Cossack groups. According to him, the peasant assembly “resembled Zaporizhzhia and the council of the Cossacks of the Sich, it had something medieval about its weapons, people, clothes, and the whole situation; it seemed to be a gathering of freemen discussing a plan for their raids”²⁹.

B. Kozelsky, a high-ranking official of the political surveillance authorities of the Ukrainian SSR, quite frankly explained the reasons for the successful resistance of the Kholodnyi Yar peasant rebels to Soviet rule in a book published in the 1920s by explaining the history of the region. “Because of its ... peculiar romance,” Kozelsky noted, ‘woven from the remnants of the Middle Ages, Kholodnyi Yar was an impregnable fortress for the Soviet government,’ because ‘every piece of land, every village and hamlet is a monument to the Haidamachchyna,’ he argued³⁰.

After the contemporaries of the revolutionary events, historians clearly pointed to the realization of a certain behavioral tradition connected with the historical past in the context of revolutionary events. For example, the famous historian M. Pokrovsky drew attention to the “coincidence of the 1905 peasant revolution and the Makhnovist revolution in the same places”. “...those counties of the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkiv, and Poltava provinces that were the theater of the Makhnovist movement are the counties of the most

²⁹ Дикий А. Из истории партизанской борьбы на Черкашине (Воспоминания о 1919 году). *Летопись революции*. 1927. № 2 (23). С. 98–99, 101.

³⁰ Козельський Б. Шлях зрадництва й авантюри (петлюрівське повстанство). Харків : Державне видавництво України, 1927. С. 75.

vivid movement of 1905... The most vivid movement of 1905 and the Makhnovist movement took place on the same territory..." he noted³¹. Modern researchers of the "peasant republics" of the revolutionary period also note that "the same villages were at the forefront of peasant revolutionariness in 1917–1921 as in 1902–1907"³². Contemporary historian D. Archireiskyi explains the same "Makhnovism" by even deeper origins than the events of the first years of the twentieth century. He points out that the settlements covered by N. Makhno's power in the historical past "were not lordly, and their inhabitants remembered their Cossack lineage even in the early twentieth century"³³.

According to contemporary scholarly literature, the Cossack origin of the peasant uprising also manifested the symbolic and ritual functions of weapons. Its character determined the status of a peasant rebel. Weapons were used in the ritual of burying the dead. Among the rebels, death with arms was considered a worthy death. Weapons were exchanged as a sign of fraternization³⁴.

In the dissertation of V. Lozovyi, the connection between the revolutionary struggle of the peasantry and the historically formed culture and social practice is revealed in detail. The researcher states that "For the peasant consciousness, the "Cossack ideal" had a special attraction". This "ideal" determined the socio-political behavior

³¹ Покровский М. Виступ без назви в обговоренні доповіді С. М. Дубровського «Крестьянство в революции 1905 г.» 20 листопада 1925 р. *Историк-марксист*. 1926. Т. I. С. 269.

³² Корновенко С., Берестовий А., Компанієць О., Пасічна Ю., П'янзін С., Щербаков М. Селянське республікотворення періоду Української революції 1917–1921 рр. Черкаси : Чабаненко Ю. А., 2019. С. 165.

³³ Архірейський Д. Аграрні передумови махновського руху (до проблеми земельних відносин та диференціації селянства Південної України у переддень революції 1917 р.). *Питання аграрної історії України та Росії: матеріали десятих наукових читань, присвячених пам'яті Д. П. Пойди* : зб. наук. пр. Дніпропетровськ : Вид-во ПФ «Стандарт-Сервіс», 2014. С. 69.

³⁴ Зозуля Н. Повстанський рух на Середньому Подніпров'ї (1918–1922 рр.) за спогадами старшин армії УНР : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. Черкаси, 2018. С. 11, 16.

of the peasants, which ignored the norms established by the state authorities. Therefore, along with the official institutions of power, “Councils of Peasant Deputies and Village Unions” emerged, which “were supposed to become the main bodies of the organized peasantry regarding the formation and control ... of all power structures and institutions”. In the practice of solving problems of social relations, Ukrainian farmers used “not state legal acts, but norms of customary law”. According to V. Lozovoy, “village and parish committees under the control of the peasants adopted illegal resolutions, carried out arrests, carried out arbitrary actions (which seemed fair to them from the point of view of peasant morality), removed judges and administered justice themselves” and “were aimed at the embodiment of ... peasant interests, not the interests of the state and society”. For farmers, the “resolutions of peasant congresses” were the highest norm in the regulation of social relations, “the peasant level of legal awareness gave these resolutions the status of local laws”, noted V. Lozovyi³⁵.

P. Korinenko and B. Baran came to similar conclusions regarding the political and legal culture of the peasantry during the revolution. They noted the disregard of existing legislative norms by Ukrainian farmers, even in the conditions of the arrangement of revolutionary authorities. The researchers noted the “increase in illegal actions” by villagers, drew attention to “the clear criminal character of illegal actions by the villagers”. In the revolutionary conditions, the traditional self-governing institutions – the community, the peasant estate, and even rallies – became legitimate authorities for the peasantry³⁶.

³⁵ Лозовий В. Ставлення селянства України до влади в добу Центральної Ради (березень 1917 р. – квітень 1918 р.) : автореф. дис. ... докт. іст. наук. Київ, 2010. С. 18–19, 26 та ін.

³⁶ Коріненко П., Баран Б. Правові засади земельних відносин в українському селі в першій половині XX ст. Історичний аспект. Тернопіль : ТНПУ ім. В. Гнатюка, 2021. С. 63, 65, 68–69, 117.

Obviously, this behavior of disregarding the norms and rules of life imposed by other socio-political forces and the implementation of one's own rules was determined by motives of justice, as well as the ability to carry out one's own program of transformations developed by tradition and creativity of the revolutionary era and the organization of its implementation. True, the embodiment of justice was proposed by the peasantry in a narrowly social way, combined with ignoring the interests of other classes, and even with their physical removal from the arena of public life.

The active striving for social justice, combined with the radical nature of its implementation, gave birth to massive malicious intentions and values towards others, which were also applied to representatives of their own peasant environment. According to the results of the research of the revolutionary era, P. Korinenko noted that the peasants "without particularly thinking, embarked on the path of armed struggle, committed violence against others (often the same peasants) and took pleasure in it". According to P. Korinenko, the moral face of the peasantry tended to reach such a level that "the peasants lost their sense of dignity, compassion for their neighbor, especially if he had more property". To denote this social phenomenon of the peasant environment, the scientist proposed the concepts of "politicization of consciousness"³⁷ and "militarization of consciousness". The bearers of this consciousness were obviously well depicted by a contemporary in the early 1920s: "...a backward, thuggish, but poor population"³⁸.

The "militarization of consciousness" no longer predicted and did not condition life at the expense of agricultural work, but provoked the solution of all problems by seizing the property of others³⁹.

³⁷ Коріненко П. Земельне питання в історичній долі українського селянства. Погляд крізь віки. Тернопіль : ТНПУ ім. В. Гнатюка, 2022. С. 82–83.

³⁸ Доповіді в Губвиконкомі про життя села. *Сільрада*. 1925. № 2. С. 17.

³⁹ Коріненко П. Земельне питання в історичній долі українського селянства. Погляд крізь віки. Тернопіль : ТНПУ ім. В. Гнатюка, 2022. С. 82–83.

It is not by chance that a certain part of the peasant insurgent units, according to the researcher of the peasant movement during the revolution Y. Kotlyar, turned “into bandit formations”⁴⁰.

O. Mykhailiuk called social activity and, at the same time, moral decay of the peasantry in the context of the revolutionary struggle with their socio-cultural and political consequences “social banditry”. The latter, according to the scholar, is “a living unity of polar characteristics”⁴¹. In other words, “social banditry” is a phenomenon that manifests both the struggle for genuine social justice and the objective inability of a certain part of the peasantry to remain within the limits of moral norms and not succumb to purely criminal behavior or immoral behavior. The process of upholding social justice is not always able to develop, disseminate and establish a new morality in time, to protect and multiply the expedient rules of life tested by previous history. Some participants in revolutionary transformations, in the face of the rejection of the old order and its norms, resort to borrowing the already existing ethics of malice developed in the criminal environment, which, like revolutionary morality, calls for acting contrary to the existing legal order.

O. Mykhailiuk noted that the generally accepted meaning of the concept of “social banditry” implies a reflection of the pre-political worldview and behavior, the traditional culture of the peasantry. However, in the context of the revolution, the phenomenon of “social banditry” also acquired a political character, “politicization,” as the researcher writes. At the same time, the “politicization” of peasant behavior did not stop,

⁴⁰ Котляр Ю. Повстансько-партизанський рух українських селян у 1919 – на початку 1920 рр. (На матеріалах Півдня України) : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. Одеса, 1997. С. 11–12.

⁴¹ Михайлюк О. Селянство України в перші десятиліття XX ст.: соціокультурні процеси. Дніпропетровськ : Інновація, 2007. С. 342 та ін.

as O. Mykhailiuk points out, its “criminalization” caused by the influence of urban civilization and the decay of the traditional way of life in the village⁴².

The concepts of “politicization of consciousness,” “militarization of consciousness,” and “social banditry” obviously reflect a phenomenon that was not an achievement of the revolutionary times of the early twentieth century, the period of 1917–1920. It manifested itself throughout the centuries of history, and was realized in the form of peasant uprisings and Cossack wars, the movement of opryshkos and haidamaks, and the Koliyivshchyna. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a set of acute social problems that triggered the revolutionary process once again revived the centuries-old ideological tool of adaptation to revolutionary conditions – “militarization of consciousness” and “social banditry” – that is, the willingness to radically satisfy one’s interests by force, muscle effort, and armed force, to ignore danger and deprive opponents and enemies of property, power, and life, and to impose social norms and moral values favorable to oneself.

There are reasons to talk about the ideological and organizational armament of the peasantry in the conditions of the revolutionary struggle of 1917–1920. A conscious resource in the form of an appropriate economic culture, mass socio-economic aspirations and moral-psychological readiness for social transformations, which received, in particular, a formalization in modern concepts “ideomaniacs”, “militarization of consciousness” and “social banditry” and the effectiveness of peasant communities create a convincing picture of the self-sufficiency of the Ukrainian peasantry in the revolutionary struggle. At the same time, despite the ideological and organizational armament of the peasantry in the conditions of the revolution, the peasantry did not show the ability or noticeable attempts to independently form a national

⁴² Михайлюк О. Селянство України в перші десятиліття XX ст.: соціокультурні процеси. Дніпропетровськ : Інновація, 2007. С. 342 та ін.

government or at least a state formation within the limits of a respectable territorial scale. Perhaps this is due to the lack of an effective political party that would enjoy the trust and active support of the peasantry. In a purely amateur mode, the revolutionized agriculturists managed to achieve only the activation of the activities of rural communities and the formation of the so-called “peasant republics”. In Dnieper Ukraine, during the time of the revolution, the last ones count up to two dozen. The reasons for the creation of these “republics” with a territorial extent, as a rule, from one or several villages to entire volosts and counties, are called by researchers “self-preservation, localization ... to survive ... in ... too changing socio-political circumstances ... and biologically”, protection from various regimes. It is not by chance that certain such “republics” are characterized by their “anti-Bolshevik trend” or “anti-Denikin”⁴³. There was also a “peasant republic”, which modern historians call “robbery”, and another – “banal gangster”⁴⁴. That is, these “republics” became a real embodiment of the negative version of the mentioned “social banditry”. Both the “republics” that were built on the idea of resistance to hostile political orders, and the “republics” overflowing with criminal aspirations grew out of the traditional communal foundations of the life of Ukrainian farmers, and became a reaction of the peasant system to the complexity of the socio-political situation.

At the same time, a significant part of the “peasant republics” maintained a clear course in support of certain forms of statehood – the Ukrainian People’s Republic or the Soviet state⁴⁵. They should be considered as centers of these state formations, and not only as a form

⁴³ Корновенко С., Берестовий А., Компанієць О., Пасічна Ю., П’янін С., Щербakov М. Селянське республікотворення періоду Української революції 1917–1921 рр. Черкаси : Чабаненко Ю. А., 2019. С. 106–109, 111, 116–117, 128, 135, 143 та ін.

⁴⁴ Ibid. С. 122, 129.

⁴⁵ Ibid. С. 121, 123, 125, 133, 141 та ін.

of self-defense of the peasantry in conditions of armed confrontation. in their cultural basis, both the traditional community principles of life and the latest, as at that time, trends of public and political life were combined, in these “republics” the true political consciousness and political self-organization of the peasantry manifested itself. Obviously, what has been said will also be true for Nestor Makhn’s “Gulyajpil Republic”.

However, the territory covered by the “peasant republics”, and thus the extent of the peasant society, the capabilities of which they demonstrated, was insignificant⁴⁶. The bulk of the peasantry remained within the limits of self-organization in communities and the distribution of landlord property and was a participant, an active subject only of the economic revolution in the countryside, and not of the political revolution on a national scale.

The attitude of the majority of representatives of the peasantry to the revolutionary process under the conditions of a limited resource of political ideas had a specific and expedient-rational character. Among the political forces that were capable of organizing state power on a large territory, the peasantry tried to choose and support their optimal option and set demands for such support. The latter may appear as a lack of stable, consistent political positions and a limited social ability to organize state power. However, in this way, Ukrainian farmers defended their social interest in the specific conditions of their capabilities and political reality. The researcher of the Ukrainian peasantry, P. Korinenko, rightly pointed out that the peasant insurgent formations “struggled against all the authorities that limited their rights”⁴⁷. It was through this that the peasantry manifested itself as a self-sufficient revolutionary force, forced

⁴⁶ Корновенко С., Берестовий А., Компанієць О., Пасічна Ю., П’янзін С., Щербаков М. Селянське республікотворення періоду Української революції 1917–1921 рр. Черкаси : Чабаненко Ю. А., 2019. С. 194.

⁴⁷ Коріненко П. Історія українського селянства. Тернопіль : Вид. відділ ТНПУ, 2014. С. 101.

it to reckon with its interests, and, constituting the bulk of the population, made the existing power regimes dependent on it.

The general dynamics of political and ideological sympathies of ordinary Ukrainian farmers was studied in detail by V. Masnenko. According to him, "...the peasants as a military and political force were characterized by very changeable moods. They, as a rule, first welcomed every new government that promised to resolve the land issue in accordance with their interests, later became disappointed with it, and finally rebelled against it." Regarding the part of the peasantry that was ready for armed struggle, V. Masnenko noted that "the military actions of the armed peasantry were mainly defensive in nature (on the principle of 'defending their own farm'). The localization of peasant thinking and the isolation of the "peasant world" were evident⁴⁸. With such "thinking", peasants did not accept their involvement in the armed formations of various state and political entities. A. Lysenko, studying the reasons for desertion, argues that "the majority of Ukrainian soldiers did not want to sacrifice their lives for other people's ideals, preferring to defend their own homes or settlements"⁴⁹.

The "localization of thinking" of the peasants could be characterized by a lack of understanding of general political events and, at the same time, a completely adequate statement about the uncertainty of the political situation and the cataclysm of socio-political life. Here are the memoirs of a contemporary of the revolutionary events, a rural resident of the Chyhyryn region. She claimed that in 1917 "Tsar Nikola was overthrown" and "anarchy" began, which lasted until the mid-1920s. Probably,

⁴⁸ Масненко В. Як українські селяни стали воїнами (до соціокультурних і мілітарних аспектів революції 1917–1921 рр.). *Український селянин*. 2018. Вип. 18. С. 57.

⁴⁹ Лисенко А. Деякі суспільно-політичні причини дезертирства в роки громадянської війни на Україні (1918–1919 рр.). *Україна Соборна*. 2006. Вип. 4. Том 1. С. 150–151.

a significant part of Ukrainian farmers perceived political reality in this way and avoided any participation in political life.

The political outlook and behavior of the Ukrainian peasantry during the revolutionary struggle of 1917–1920 showed different, at first glance, even opposite trends. In their struggle and everyday life, Ukrainian farmers realized centuries-old, apparently not fully realized traditions of social behavior, their ideas and aspirations. During the revolution, the achievements of social culture accumulated by the history of the Ukrainian peasantry were mobilized, and they were quite obvious, their manifestations did not require a deep immersion in the content of the events to see the Cossack face of the peasant revolution.

High socio-political activity was characterized by Ukrainian farmers and their consistency in defending and armed struggle for their interests. Disregard for law and order and morality that did not agree with the position of the peasantry, readiness for radical actions, and physical destruction of opponents were characteristic features of the political ethics of the peasantry. The high level of organization within rural communities and even their agglomerations and the recognition of the status of the highest authority by the peasant self-government bodies are also integral characteristics of the political perceptions and capacities of peasants and their right-wing culture.

The above was combined with low political awareness, localized perception of public life, and unwillingness to participate in general political processes at the national level.

On the eve of the revolutionary events, the ethnographic mass of the peasantry underwent a process of ethnic self-identification and the formation of a sense of national belonging and consciousness. The reasons for this were the economic trends of peasant farming, the educational and ideological work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the large-scale political events of the twentieth century.

In the early twentieth century, contemporaries noted manifestations of national identity among peasant farmers who were economically and politically independent. In 1914, the journal “Ukrainian Life” (“Ukraine Life”) spoke of conscious Ukrainians “from the spheres of the wealthy peasantry” who “form a class of economically strong and politically independent farmers” – that is, capable of defending their social and national interests at both the economic and political levels⁵⁰. According to the same magazine, such farmers-owners “do not break their ties with either the Ukrainian nationality or the Ukrainian language” and “as expected, Ukrainian capital is growing in the person of the middle peasantry, which preserves the national features and national language of the indigenous population of Ukraine”⁵¹.

It was not only about the preservation of host peasants as bearers of a certain ethnic culture, but also their acquisition of a very specific idea of their ethnic belonging and the ability to realize their interests as representatives of the ethnic group. Behind this was the problem of small land and the ownership of land areas by representatives of another culture – russians and Poles, as well as the dominance of the commodity services market by speculators – the same Russians, Poles and Jews who first bought cheaply and then resold the products of peasant farms. The famous Ukrainian historian. On this occasion, M. Yavorskyi wrote with specific categories of his vocabulary: “...the hated Russian commercial capital and its homegrown, but worn-out, this is the main enemy of the Ukrainian bourgeois entity”⁵².

⁵⁰ Правобережец В. Политика польских руководящих сфер по отношению к Украине. *Украинская жизнь*. 1914. № 12. С. 35.

⁵¹ Гордиенко М. Капитализм и русская культура на Украине. *Украинская жизнь*. 1912. № 9. С. 21.

⁵² Яворський М. Проблема української націонал-демократичної революції у 1917 р., її історичні основи та її рухові сили. *Червоний шлях*. 1927. № 2. С. 123.

The peasant owner, called a “bourgeois entity”, felt his cultural otherness as a result of sharp socio-economic contradictions with the foreign environment. Obviously, for some, this otherness remained a manifestation of traditional culture, recognition of someone else’s ideas and behavior established in the peasant society. However, for a certain part of the farmers, the relationship with the non-ethnic element determined the search for their national identity. A well-known participant in the events of the revolution. On this occasion, D. Lebyd noted that the protection of social and economic interests began to be combined by the peasantry with the solution of the national question. “Kurkul of the Ukrainian village ... felt it”, noted D. Lebid – that the national issue can become for him the force with which he, it may happen, will be able to preserve his kulak well-being”⁵³.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia devoted itself to the formation of national consciousness among the peasant masses. The effectiveness of its activities in this area was recognized by the bodies of political supervision. According to the data of the Kyiv security department in 1913, “the Little Russian intelligentsia ... made great progress in the sense of propagating a false doctrine about the origin of Ukraine, ... as well as ideas about the possibilities ... of an “independent Ukraine”⁵⁴.

The events of the First World War accelerated the process of ethnic self-identification and self-awareness. The inevitability of constant contact in army units with representatives of different ethnic groups objectively forced farmers mobilized into the army to think about their own identity. About 2.8 million people were conscripted from the rural settlements of Dnipro river valley

⁵³ Лебедь Д. Крестьянство в революции. *Октябрьская революция: первое пятилетие*. Харьков: Государственное издательство Украины, 1922. С. 78.

⁵⁴ ЦДІАК. Ф. 442. Оп. 861. Од. зб. 259. Частина 1. Арк. 44 зв.

in Ukraine⁵⁵ and they made up the majority of the 3.5 million or, according to other data, 4.5 million, mobilized from the territory of the province, which covered Ukrainian ethnographic territories⁵⁶. As a result, public associations of Ukrainians began to emerge in the armed forces of the empire. In the fall of 1917, there were 1,337 such organizations⁵⁷.

As for to the assessment of a well-known contemporary of the era of the revolution D. Lebed, “by the time of the October Revolution, the peasantry of Ukraine half fell under nationalist influence”⁵⁸ – that is, it identified itself by nationality and had political behavior determined by this characteristic. It is not surprising that the revolutionary events of 1917 distinguished themselves by the declaration of national aspirations. Regional peasant congresses – provincial and district – in Kyiv region, Katerynoslav region, Podilla, Poltava region, Kharkiv region, Kherson region, Chernihiv one spoke in favor of the autonomy of Ukraine⁵⁹. National problems were also considered by Ukrainian farmers in the councils of peasant deputies⁶⁰.

The First All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress, which took place on May 28-June 2, 1917, put forward a comprehensive program of national and political revival: state and territorial autonomy for Ukraine, the introduction of the Ukrainian language in government and educational institutions, and the appointment of ethnic Ukrainians to leadership positions. The congress also

⁵⁵ Волковинський В. Бойові дії на українських землях. *Перша світова війна 1914–1918 рр. і Україна. Українські землі у центрі цивілізаційної кризи* / упор. О. П. Реснт. Київ : Кліо, 2015. С. 28, 44.

⁵⁶ Ibid. С. 27.

⁵⁷ Ibid. С. 43.

⁵⁸ Лебедь Д. Крестьянство в революции. *Октябрьская революция: первое пятилетие*. Харьков : Государственное издательство Украины, 1922. С. 78.

⁵⁹ Верстюк В. Український національно-визвольний рух (березень – листопад 1917). *Український історичний журнал*. 2003. № 3. С. 71.

⁶⁰ Хміль І. Трудяще селянство України в боротьбі за владу Рад. Київ : Наукова думка, 1977. С. 30.

demonstrated the peasantry's perception of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory and raised the issue of protecting the rights of Ukrainians outside Ukraine⁶¹.

The support of the Ukrainian People's Republic realized the national feelings of the farmers. In 1917, an active part of the peasantry saw the Ukrainian Central Rada as a national government and expected the Provisional Government to recognize it, opposed the Provisional Government's instructions that provided for the dismemberment of the territory of Ukraine, and supported the proclamation of the UPR within nine Ukrainian provinces⁶².

The peasantry participated in the armed struggle to preserve the Ukrainian People's Republic⁶³. The commitment of the peasantry to the UPR was clearly stated by its opponent, the Soviet government. One of the latter's analytical documents stated that as of 1919, "if they choose any of the existing authorities, the peasants see Petlura's government as the least evil"⁶⁴. Jan Hamarnik, a well-known figure in the Bolshevik Party, did not hesitate to admit this in the Soviet press: "The Kyiv region was a foothold for Petliura's formations and active anti-Soviet protests in 1919 and 1920". And he noted that "...only in 1921... did it become a Soviet province in the sense that the Soviet apparatus took possession...even

⁶¹ Хміль І. В. Перший Всеукраїнський селянський з'їзд (28 травня – 2 червня 1917 р.). Київ : Поліграф. д-ця Ін-т історії України НАН України, 1992. С. 14, 20, 25–26, 34.

⁶² Куташев І. Селянський рух в Україні (березень 1917 р. – квітень 1918 р.) : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. К., 2003. С. 8–9, 11.

⁶³ Нестеров О. Селянський повстанський рух на правобережній Україні (1919 р.) : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. Київ, 2001. С. 10; Зозуля Н. Повстанський рух на Середньому Подніпров'ї (1918–1922 рр.) за спогадами старшин армії УНР : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. Черкаси, 2018. С. 12; Боган С. Повстанський рух в Одеській губернії у 1920–1923 роках : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. Одеса, 2003. С. 15 та ін.

⁶⁴ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України (далі – ЦДАГО). Ф. 1. Оп. 20. Частина 1. Спр. 39. Арк. 88.

of the village”⁶⁵. This means that only the conquest of the countryside marked the victory over Petliurism. But even after the Ukrainian People’s Republic was ousted and the Ukrainian SSR was established, an active part of the peasantry remained committed to the UPR. The latter’s leadership controlled the anti-Soviet peasant movement in the 1920s⁶⁶, and its collapse in 1924 was ordered by Symon Petlura⁶⁷.

In the case of support for other regimes in Ukraine, the peasantry demanded that they resolve the national question and take into account the national interests of Ukrainian peasants. In the case of support for the Soviet government, Ukrainian peasants refused to participate in hostilities outside the territory of Ukraine. For example, in 1919, in the Radomyshl district of the Kyiv region, when the White Guards were approaching, the Bolsheviks mobilized local farmers, who were sympathetic to the idea. However, when they learned that they would have to fight outside Ukraine, according to a letter to Lenin from the head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Foreign Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Boroborists), H. Hrynko, “...everyone ran away and spread the news to the surrounding villages...the news that Denikin is a few miles from our villages, and we are being taken to Great Russia...”. During the next mobilization campaign for the Red Army, “young people fled to the surrounding forests.” However, the peasants did not refuse to fight, expressing a desire to join the “Ukrainian Red Army” because they were “Ukrainian

⁶⁵ Гамарник Я. Итоги 1921 года и ближайшие задачи. *Журнал Киевского губернского экономического совещания*. 1922. № 1. С. 4.

⁶⁶ Боган С. Повстанський рух в Одеській губернії у 1920–1923 роках : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. Одеса, 2003. С. 15 та ін.

⁶⁷ Красносілецький Д. Антибільшовицький рух селян в правобережній частині УСРР у 1920–1924 роках : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук. Чернівці, 2007. С. 13.

Bolsheviks” and categorically did not want to “go to Great Russia, because Denikin is standing ... near their villages”⁶⁸.

In turn, the Bolshevik government treated the peasantry as a completely nationally organized community. According to a contemporary, a member of the foreign Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party of Ukraine H. Klunny, “the Soviet authorities burned whole villages ... and the peasant poor” and “shoots a member of their party (CPU) ... just because he declared his Ukrainian sympathies”⁶⁹. And already as a consequence of such a situation, according to the information department of the Central Committee of the CPU, Ukrainian peasants “are afraid of the arrival of Soviet troops from Russia like fire” and only “dream about their” Bolsheviks⁷⁰.

The opinions of ordinary farmers regarding the fate of the national question in the conditions of Soviet power are conveyed by the conversation of the inhabitants of the village of Andriivka, Poltava province, which took place in 1919. An instructor from the provincial union of cooperatives who arrived in the village during a conversation with the villagers slandered that the Bolshevik party had a “dangerous view for the gains of the revolution” on national issue, then he got the support of those present. The interlocutors of the peasants, among them local Bolsheviks, said that the “ruling party” is proposing something that “doesn’t suit us” and that what the “ruling party” is striving for “it will not do”⁷¹.

National feelings, national motives in the behavior of the peasantry were a reality of the times of the revolution, violent and violent socio-political struggle of 1917–1920. Determination of the attitude to reality, participation in military actions in favor

⁶⁸ ЦДАГО. Ф. 43. Оп. 1. Спр. 46. Арк. 7.

⁶⁹ Ibid. Арк. 1–3.

⁷⁰ ЦДАГО. Ф. 1. Оп. 20. Частина 1. Спр. 39. Арк. 88.

⁷¹ Раузів С. На хуторах (Андріївське споживче т-во Демидів. волости Полт. пов.). *Полтавський кооператор*. 1919. № 5. С. 30.

of one or another government were also determined by the national interests realized by the farmers. Nowadays, it is difficult to judge how general the tendency towards a sense of national belonging was among the peasantry. Obviously, the national awareness concerned primarily the most socially and politically active part of the peasantry.

In the conditions of the revolution, there was a mobilization of the historically formed worldview of the Ukrainian peasantry and the aspiration to implement the cherished social dreams of justice into the practice of daily life. 1917–1920 were a period of high social activity of the peasant class, which reached the level of neglecting the interests of other social strata and representatives of their environment, physical destruction of opponents. The economic culture of the peasantry was characterized by an unconditional belief in its right to the landowner's estates and even to the property of socially and culturally related elements of the peasant society, readiness to solve material problems not by economic, but by force methods and armed forces.

The high level of social activity, determined by the ideals of economic existence and the conviction of the legitimacy of one's behavior, was combined with the locality of thinking and capacity for action in relation to general political processes, the lack of consistent attachment to the state-political entities that existed in the period 1917–1920. Behind this was the limited outlook and low level of awareness and education of the peasantry and its social inability to political consolidation on a nationwide scale. At the same time, behind such political behavior lay a completely rational and expedient position. In the absence of government regimes satisfying their interests, Ukrainian farmers effectively adjusted the work of their local peasant communities or naturally avoided participation in political life. The inability of the peasantry to form state power on a national scale was compensated by the support of those regimes of power that showed the potential to satisfy the aspirations of the peasantry. The existence of "peasant republics", which acted

as representatives of certain state-political entities, testify to the existence of a tendency to transform the peasant society into a segment of the political nation.

The understanding of their national affiliation by some segment of peasantry in the conditions of revolutionary events became an important factor in the political process and the results of the revolutionary struggle. The ability of certain state-political regimes to satisfy national interests has become a criterion for their assessment, loyalty or support from the Ukrainian peasantry. The attitude of farmers to the authorities was a manifestation of conscious national belonging.

Information about the authors:

Ihor Fareniiy,

Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor,
Professor of Department of Archaeology
and special spheres of historical science,
Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University of Cherkasy,
Cherkasy, Ukraine

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5176-6055>

e-mail: fareniiy_igor@ukr.net

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